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NOT QUITE BRADBURY'S FAHRENHEIT 451:
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SENSE-ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGY IN THE AFTERMATH OF
UNITED STATES v. KYLLO
Heather K. McShain*
Outside the front door, in the rain, a faint scratching.
Montag froze. He saw Mildred thrust herself back to the wall and gasp.
"Someone - the door - why doesn't the door-voice tell us

-"

"I shut it off."
Under the doorsill, a slow, probing sniff, an exhalation of electric steam.
Mildred laughed. "It's only a dog, that's what! You want me to shoo
him away?"
"Stay where you are!"
Silence. The cold rain falling. And the smell of blue electricity blowing under the locked door.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1992, an agent of the United
States Department of the Interior and a Staff Sergeant of the Oregon National
Guard parked their car across the street from Danny Kyllo's home on a residential street in Florence, Oregon.2 From the passenger seat of the car, the Staff
Sergeant aimed an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager at Danny Kyllo's
home, the middle home of a triplex. 3 Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation,
not visible to the naked eye but emitted by most objects.4 The imager converts
radiation into images, based on relative warmth. 5 Operating much like a video
2

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001); United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 1996).

3

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30; Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044; Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, at *2.

4

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.

5

Id.
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camera, it can show
heat images in different colors, denoting relative differences
6
in temperature.
The Agema Thermovision detected high heat coming from the roof
above the garage and one wall of Danny Kyllo's home.7 The officers, believing
that Danny Kyllo was using high-wattage heat lamps to grow marijuana in his
home, used the results of the thermal scan (along with informants' tips and utility bill records) to obtain a search warrant.8 A search of the home revealed a
complete marijuana grow operation. 9
Addressing Danny Kyllo's motion to suppress, both the Oregon District
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
thermal scan of the house did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 10 A majority of the Supreme Court justices disagreed. Opting not to follow over thirty years of established precedent, the majority in Kyllo reversed
and held that "[w]here ...the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."' 1
This article explores the Supreme Court's holding in Kyllo, and concludes that the majority reached the wrong result. Part II summarizes past Supreme Court precedent on Fourth Amendment searches, highlighting those cases
that involved the use of technology and sensory-augmenting devices.' 2 Part II
discusses the Kyllo case, the biggest change in Fourth Amendment law in decades. 13 It concludes that the majority not only reached the wrong conclusion,
but that it should have decided Kyllo on already established Fourth Amendment
precedent. The new rule promulgated by the majority in Kyllo, along with being
unnecessary, will plague courts for years to come as they struggle with the resulting confusions and unanswered questions created by the rule. Part IV applies Kyllo to a new piece of technology used by the government and law enforcement, the ion scan. This article predicts that courts will be forced to deem
6

Id. ("[B]lack is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences.").

7
Id. at 30; Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044 (9th Cir. 1999); Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, at *2. The Staff
Sergeant who administered the thermal imager stated in his report that "[t]he center bldg. showed
much warmer than the bids [sic] on either side." Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, at *2. At the evidentiary hearing before the District Court, the Sergeant testified that "[t]he main conclusion that I
reached was that there was definitely something unusual within the structure that was generating
that excess heat." Id.
a
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
9
10

11

Id.
Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047; Ky~lo, 1996 WL 125594 at *2.

12

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
See discussion infra Part H.

13

See discussion infra Part II.
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the warrantless use of an ion scan an unconstitutional search as a result of the
Supreme Court's erroneous holding in Kyllo. 14 This is an unsettling result,
given the many decades of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law that has
evolved around the core concept of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and whether it is one that society is willing to recognize. Because of
Kyllo, the Supreme Court has eliminated this entire history, in exchange for a
blanket rule that will likely bar the warrantless use of all sensory-enhancing
technology, at least when the application of the technology involves a home.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW KATZ AND ITS PROGENY

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the5 place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.'
In 1967 the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States,16 which first
articulated (by way of Justice Harlan's concurrence) the test which determines
whether a search has occurred: "there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ' " 7 In the decades that preceded Katz, the Supreme Court had used a much
different standard. 18 But the years that followed Katz have produced a whole
body of case law devoted to interpreting, deciphering, and applying this analysis
and upholding the principles advanced by the Court in Katz.
Such a discussion warrants a place in this article to not only emphasize
the favorable treatment by the Supreme Court of technology and devices that
augment the senses, but to also highlight the consistently held principle that
14

See discussion infra Part IV.

15

U.S. CONST.

16

amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

17

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

18
Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment Search-Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New 'BrightLine' Rule in Determining When The Use of Technology Constitutes a Search. Kyllo v. United

States, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (2001), 2 Wyo. L. REv. 169, 173-79 (2002) (discussing history of the
Fourth Amendment prior to Katz); see also William C. Heffeman, Fourth Amendment Privacy
Interests, 92 J. CRlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002) (detailing history of the Fourth Amendment
both prior to and after the Katz decision).
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information voluntarily revealed to or placed into the public domain is undeserving of Fourth Amendment protection. The majority in Kyllo failed to appreciate the already established Fourth Amendment precedent at its disposal and
opted to develop a new rule for cases involving sensory-enhancing technology
and the home.
Before Katz Came Along - Olmstead and Goldman

A.

In 1928, the Supreme Court established in Olmstead v. United States19
that the absence of physical penetration foreclosed further Fourth Amendment
analysis. 20 In Olmstead, the issue was whether wire taps installed in conspirators' homes, who were alleged to have violated the Prohibition Act,21 amounted
to a search.22 The officers were able to install the wiretaps from the basement of
the conspirators' office building, and from the streets outside their homes.23 No
physical trespass into a home or an office was required. 24 The Supreme Court
held that "[t]here was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants. 25 Thus, the Court at the time thought the Fourth
Amendment limited only searches and seizures of tangible property.2 6
19

277 U.S. 438 (1928).

20

Id. at 466; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942).

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455 (The Act, 27 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (repealed 1935), prohibited the
importation, possession or transportation of intoxicating liquors).
Id. at 455.
22
21

23

Id. at 457.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 465.
Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making
them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence. But the
courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument connecting wires intends to project
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Here those who intercepted the projected voices were not in the
house of either party to the conversation.

Id. at 465-66.
26
See id. at 466.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physi-
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Over a decade later, this trend continued with Goldman v. United
States.2 7 The Supreme Court held that federal agents' use of a "detectaphone"
from an adjoining office to listen to a conference in Mr. Goldman's office did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no illegal trespass or
unlawful entry into Mr. Goldman's actual office.2 8 A detectaphone is a device
that picks up sound waves in an adjoining room when the receiver is placed
against the common wall. 29 The Supreme Court, in holding that the use of the
device did not offend Fourth Amendment protections, explained:
It is urged that where, as in the present case, one talks in his
own office, and intends his conversation to be confined within
the four walls of the room, he does not intend his voice shall go
beyond those walls and it is not to be assumed he takes the risk
of someone's use of a delicate detector in the next room. We
think, however, the distinction is too nice for practical application of the Constitutional guarantee, and no reasonable or logical distinction can be drawn between what federal agents did in
the present case and state officers did in the Olmsteadcase. °
The Supreme Court would continue with this standard for another thirty-five
years.
B.

A New Era Begins with Katz v. United States

In 1967, the Supreme Court turned previous search and seizure jurisprudence on its head when it held that a listening device attached to the outside
of a public telephone booth constituted a search in violation of the Fourth

cal invasion of his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
27
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Id. at 131-32, 135; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961) (affirming Goldman and holding that officers' placement of microphone inside a home's heating duct
constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes due to the officers' "unauthorized physical
penetration into the premises").
29
Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131:
28

30

[A] detectaphone, having a receiver so delicate as, when placed against the
partition wall, to pick up sound waves originating in [the adjoining] office, and
means for amplifying and hearing them. With this the agents overheard, and
the stenographer transcribed, portions of conversations between [the petitioners] on several occasions, and also heard what [one petitioner] said when talking over the telephone from his office.
Id. at 135.
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Amendment. 3' Police surveillance of Mr. Katz had revealed a strong likelihood
that he was communicating gambling information by telephone.32 FBI agents
attached an electronic listening device to the top of a glass-enclosed, public
telephone booth frequented by Mr. Katz.33 The District Court for the Southern
and Mr. Katz
District of California admitted the recorded conversations at trial,
34 The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction. 35
guilty.
was found
Mr. Katz identified two issues before the Supreme Court: first, whether
a public telephone "is a constitutionally protected area," and second, whether
"physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a
search and seizure can be said to" violate the Fourth Amendment. 36 The Supreme Court disagreed with Mr. Katz's characterization of the issues: "Inthe
first place the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily
promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right to privacy."' 37 Rather, the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places" and "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. 38
Incontrast with cases like Goldman and Olmstead, the lack of actual
physical penetration into the phone booth itself was constitutionally inconsequential to the Supreme Court's analysis.39 It was clear that Mr. Katz sought
not to exclude visual observation of himself, as he made his phone calls from
the glass-enclosed public phone booth, but that he did seek to exclude an "uninvited ear" when he closed the door to the phone booth and proceeded to make
his calls. 4° Holding that the "trespass doctrine" enunciated in Olmstead and
Goldman was no longer controlling, the Supreme Court held that the FBI's use
of the listening device did indeed constitute a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment - the government had "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. '
32

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 348 (violating 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1967)).

33

Id. at 348-49.

34

Id. at 348.

35
36

Id.; see also Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 351 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

39

Id. at 352-53.

40

Id. at 352.

41

Id. at 353.

31
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Katz Evolves

What has resulted from the Katz decision is the two-part test originating
from Justice Harlan's often cited concurrence. 42 Later deemed by the Supreme
Court as the lower courts' "lodestar, ' 43 the test has evolved through a long line
of cases: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 44
With respect to the first, subjective prong of the Katz test, the question
is "whether the individual, by his conduct .... has shown that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as private. ,,45 As to the second, objective prong of the Katz
inquiry, the question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy "is one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' - i.e.,
'whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed
objectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances.' 46 But this inquiry is not
one that measures "whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity,' 47 but instead asks "whether the government's intrusion infringes
48
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.',
Since first articulating the test in Katz, the Supreme Court has gone on
to apply the test in many contexts. What follows is a discussion of noteworthy
(and particularly relevant to the article's later discussion of Kyllo) cases that
preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo.
1.

Oliver v. United States - Open Fields

In Oliver v. United States, 49 the Supreme Court found that no reasonable
expectation of privacy existed in an open field despite the fact that the field was
a part of the defendant's property and that the defendant chose to grow his
patches of marijuana in a secluded portion of the field surrounded by woods,
42

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recov-

ering The OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547 (1999).
43
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (citing Justice Harlan's concurrence as the source of the appropriate two-part test: "This [Fourth Amendment] inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two
discrete questions.").
45
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 351) (alteration in original); see also
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
46
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted).
44

48

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984).
Id. at 182-83.

49

466 U.S. 170 (1984).

47
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chicken wire, and "No Trespassing" signs. 50 The Court rejected the notion that
"steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of privacy in an open
field are legitimate, 51 and held that no search occurred because society did not
recognize a reasonable expectation that open fields would be free from warrantless intrusion by government officials.
2.

Californiav. Greenwood - Curbside Garbage

In Californiav. Greenwood,53 the Court held that the warrantless search
and seizure of garbage bags that were placed on the defendants' curb outside
their home did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 54 Despite the fact that the
defendants may have had an expectation that their trash would not be inspected
by the police or other members of the general public, the Court held that society
did not recognize the expectation as legitimate because the defendants had exposed their garbage bags "in an area particularly suited for public inspection"
and readily observed by any member of the public.55 The Court emphasized
that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he volun,,56
tarily turns over to third parties.
3.

Smith v. Maryland - Telephone Pen Registries

In Smith v. Maryland,57 the Supreme Court held that a pen register installed at the phone company which recorded the numbers dialed by Mr. Smith
from his home did not constitute a search under Fourth Amendment analysis.5 8
Suspecting that Mr. Smith had perpetrated a robbery and was now making
threatening phone calls to the victim of that robbery, the police asked the phone
company to install a pen register at its central offices to record the phone numbers dialed from Mr. Smith's home. 59 The pen register recorded a call made
from Mr. Smith's home to the victim's home, information which the police then
used (along with other evidence) to obtain a search warrant for Mr. Smith's

50

Id. at 173-74.

51

Id. at 182.

52

Id. at 181.

53

486 U.S. 35 (1988).

54

Id. at 39-43.

55
56

Id. at 40-41 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Id. at 41 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).

57

442 U.S, 735 (1979).

58

Id. at 739-46.

59

Id. at 737.
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home. 60 Under a Katz analysis, the Supreme Court held that Mr. Smith "in all
probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dialed [from his home phone],
and that, even if he did," such an expectation
' 61
could not be "legitimate."
The Supreme Court distinguished a pen register from the listening device used in Katz. Similar to Katz, installation of the pen register did not require
a trespass onto Mr. Smith's property. In contrast, however, the pen register did
not record the "contents of communications" nor whether any "communication
[even] existed., 62 Due to these limited capabilities, Mr. Smith's only remaining
argument could be that he had an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
themselves that society deemed legitimate.63
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court doubted that society was willing
to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed
from one's home. 64 Even if a person did not know this device by name or how
it was employed, people were generally aware that the phone companies kept
records for billing and maintenance purposes that contained the numbers dialed
from their homes, and that the phone companies were equipped to trace the
source of obscene or annoying phone calls.65 Mr. Smith argued that despite
society's characterization, he himself had a subjective expectation of privacy in
the numbers he dialed given that such dialing occurred in his home. 66 The Supreme Court did not agree:
Regardless of his location, [Mr. Smith] had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same way if he
wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed the number
on his home phone rather than on some other phone could make

60

Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.

61

Id. at 745.

62

Id. at 741.
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a
pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear
sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed - a
means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.

Id. (citation omitted).
63
Id. at 741-42.
64

id. at 742.

65

Id. at 742-43.

66

Id. at 743.
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no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally
think that it would.6 7
"When he used his phone, [Mr. Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, [he] assumed
the risk that the
68
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.,
The fact that the telephone company had advanced technologically over
the years proved to be equally unpersuasive to the Court: "[Mr. Smith] concedes
that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result
is required because the telephone company has decided to auto69
mate."
4.

United States v. Knotts - Electronic Tracking Devices

In United States v. Knotts, 70 the Court held that an electronic tracking
device placed in a container purchased by the defendant and used by police to
track the movement of the defendant's car (combined with visual surveillance as
well) en route to delivering the container did not constitute a search or a seizure. 7' Police officers, believing that the respondent and two co-defendants
were buying chemicals in bulk to manufacture methamphetamine, had the Hawkins Chemical Company place the electronic beeper inside a five-gallon drum of
chloroform in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 72 The police conducted visual surveillance and used the beeper to trace the container.7 3 Police at one point lost sight
of the vehicle carrying the drum and lost the beeper's signal.74 With the help of
a monitoring device located in a helicopter, the signal of the beeper was eventually picked-up, emanating from inside of a house in a rural area of Wisconsin.75
Using the information obtained through three days of surveillance of the home
and the beeper's signal, the officers obtained a search warrant for the house and

67

Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.

a

Id. at 744.

69

Id. at 744-45.

70

460 U.S. 276 (1983).

71

Id. at 280-85.

72

Id. at 278.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 278.
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discovered a lab capable of producing both methamphetamine and ampheta76
mine.
The Court held that the use of the beeper did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.77 The Supreme Court reasoned that no legitimate
expectation of privacy existed in one's movements from place to place.78 The
"fact that the officers in [the] case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also
on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the defendant's] automobile to
the police receiver" did not affect the analysis under Katz because "[n]othing in
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.",79 As the Court further explained, "[i]nsofar as respondent's complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper
enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional foundation. We have never equated
police efficiency with unconsti8°
now.
so
do
to
decline
we
and
tutionality,
5.

United States v. Place - Drug Detecting Dogs

In United States v. Place,81 the Court determined that the use of a welltrained narcotics detection dog to sniff luggage located in a public place did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment given the limited nature of
76

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279.

77

Id. at 285.
Id. at 28 1.

78

Id. at 282. The Court did note that there was "no indication that the beeper was used in any
way to reveal information as to the movement of the [container] within the [home], or in any way
that would not have been visible ... from outside the [home]." Id. at 285. In that same discussion, however, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the police's use of the beeper despite
the fact that the beeper was used to reveal the location of the drum in the defendant's home:
79

We think that [defendant]'s contentions, [and the language used by the Court
of Appeals regarding the sanctity of the respondent's residence], to some extent lose sight of the limited use which the government made of the signals
from this particular beeper. As we have noted, nothing in this record indicates
that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that
the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest
on [defendant]'s premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of the
failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when
they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked
eyes. But scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues
which visual surveillance would not also raise.
Id. at 284-85.
80
Id. at 284.
81

462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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both the sniff and the information obtained. 2 In Place, the defendant's suspicious activities attracted the attention of officers at Miami Airport, who alerted
Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents in New York, the defendant's destination. 83 Two DEA agents observed Mr. Place as he arrived at LaGuardia Airport and identified themselves. 84 The agents informed Mr. Place
that based upon information obtained from the Miami officers, as well as their
own observations, they believed that he was transporting narcotics. 85 When the
agents asked for permission to search his luggage, Mr. Place refused.86 The
agents then told him that they were taking his luggage to a federal judge in order
to obtain a search warrant and that Mr. Place was free to go with them and stay
with his luggage. 87 Mr. Place declined their offer, and the agents gave him a
phone number at which they could be reached.88
The agents took the bags to Kennedy Airport, and had a trained narcotics detection dog perform a "sniff test" on the luggage. 89 The dog alerted to the
smaller of the two bags. 90 Approximately ninety minutes had elapsed between
the initial seizure of the luggage and the sniff test. 91 It was late in the day on a
Friday, so agents did not secure a search warrant for the smaller bag until Monday morning.92 Agents found 1,125 grams of cocaine upon opening the bag.93
The Supreme Court first concluded that, under Terry v. Ohio94 and its
progeny, officers may briefly detain luggage to investigate when observations
lead them to reasonably believe that the bags contain narcotics, provided that the
detection is limited in scope.95 But this left the Court with a second issue: what
if the canine sniff employed by the officer during the investigatory detention of
the luggage constituted a "search," thus requiring a warrant?
82

Id. at 706-07.

83

Id. at 698.

94
85

Id.
Id. at 699.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring law enforcement to have reasonable suspicion before making a brief stop).
95
Place, 462 U.S. at 706 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
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The Supreme Court concluded that it did not.96 The Court did not question that Mr. Place possessed a privacy interest in the contents of his personal
luggage that was protected by the Fourth Amendment. 97
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging
through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which
information is obtained through this investigative technique is
much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures
that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and
more intrusive investigative methods. 98
Because it was "aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure," the Supreme Court held that the investigation at issue - "exposure of... luggage, which was located in a public place,
to a trained canine - did not constitute a 'search. "99
6.

Dow Chemical Company v. United States - Aerial Viewing of
Corporate Complexes

In Dow Chemical Company v. United States, °° the Supreme Court held
that the use of a commercial aerial photographer by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to take pictures of a commercial complex from lawfully
navigable airspace with the use of a precision mapping camera did not constitute
a search. 0 1 Dow Chemical's 2,000-acre manufacturing facility consisted of
96

Id. at 707.

97

Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.

98

Id. The Court also went on to hold that the ninety-minute detention of the luggage was
unreasonable given the time between seizure and the canine sniff, and the agents' failure to inform
Mr. Place of the place to which they were taking his luggage, the length of time he would be disposed had he accompanied his bags, and what arrangements could be made to return his bags if
their investigation turned up nothing. Id. at 710.
100
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
99

101

Id. at 229, 239.
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covered buildings and uncovered equipment and piping conduits between the
buildings. 0 2 Dow took extreme security measures around the perimeter of the
complex, preventing public observations at the ground level.'0 3 Dow also inves04
tigated all low-level flights by aircraft over the complex.'
Prior to the flight over the complex, enforcement officials of the EPA
made an on-site inspection of two of Dow's power plants; Dow then denied the
EPA's subsequent request for a second inspection.' °5 The EPA did not seek an
administrative search warrant, but instead hired a commercial aerial photograWhen
pher to take pictures of the facility from lawfully navigable airspace.
against
suit
it
brought
taken,
Dow was informed that the photographs had been
07
the EPA alleging Fourth Amendment violations.
The Court determined that the aerial surveillance and photography of
portions of Dow's complex were more akin to the search of an
the uncovered
08
open field: 1
It may well be... that surveillance of private property by using
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. But, the photographs
here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to
an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere
fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. An
Id. at 229. Dow explained that "the cost of covering its exposed equipment would be prohibitive." Id.
102

103

Id.

104
105

Id.
Id.

106

Id. The photographs taken were "essentially like those used in mapmaking." Id. at 231.

107

Id. at 230.

Id. at 239. Dow conceded that simple fly-over observation or photographs taken from a
nearby hilltop would not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 234. Dow did question whether
its manufacturing facility was constitutionally protected by a concept of "industrial curtilage," a
hybrid of the common-law curtilage doctrine, and whether photography employing an aerial mapping camera was permissible in this context. Id. at 235.
108

The Court placed Dow's complex as falling somewhere between two extreme doctrines the curtilage doctrine and the "open fields" doctrine - and lacking "critical characteristics" of
each. Id. at 236-37. In dismissing Dow's argument that its complex fell within the "industrial
curtilage," the Court emphasized that the search at issue did not involve any physical entry and
that Dow, unlike the precautions it had taken against ground surveillance, had done nothing to
protect against aerial surveillance despite its close proximity to an airport. Id. at 237 n.4, 237-38.
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electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear
and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or
other trade secrets would raise very different and far more serious questions; other protections such as trade secret laws are
available to protect commercial
activities from private surveil10 9
competitors.
by
lance
The Court took no issue with the fact that planes and precision mapping
cameras had not always been available for law enforcement use:
The photographs at issue in this case are essentially like those
commonly used in mapmaking. Any person with an airplane
and an aerial camera could readily duplicate them. In common
with much else, the technology of photography [and flight have]
changed in this century. These developments have enhanced industrial processes, and indeed all areas of life; they have also
enhanced law enforcement techniques. 1 0
7.

Californiav. Ciraolo- Aerial Viewing of a Home's Yard

The Supreme Court held in Californiav. Ciraolo1l that a search did not
occur when police secured a private plane to fly over defendant's house to observe marijuana plants growing in his backyard." 2 An anonymous informant
tipped the Santa Clara police to the backyard grow operation. 1 3 The police
were unable to see into his backyard because Mr. Ciraolo had completely surrounded his entire yard with a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence.1 14
The police hired a private plane to fly over Mr. Ciraolo's house at an altitude of
1,000 feet, which was within navigable airspace." 5 From the vantage point in
the plane, the officers observed growing marijuana in Mr. Ciraolo's yard and
used a standard 35mm camera to take pictures of the plants from the air." 6 A
search warrant was obtained using an affidavit from one of the officers on the
plane, which included descriptions of the anonymous tip and the officers' observations, along with pictures of Mr. Ciraolo's home, his backyard, and neighbor-

109

Dow Chemical,476 U.S. at 238-39.

110

Id. at 231.

111 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
112 Id. at 215.
113

Id. at 209.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.
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ing houses.

17

Upon execution of the warrant, officers seized 73 marijuana

plants.l1'
Under the Katz rubric, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that the defendant clearly had a subjective intent to maintain the privacy of his
"unlawful agricultural pursuits," at least from ground observation, given that he
had completely enclosed his backyard with two fences, one of which reached
ten feet high. 19 But given that officers could have observed his yard from, for
example, the "top of a truck or a two-level bus," Mr. Ciraolo "appear[ed] to [be]
challeng[ing] the authority of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose,
and not the result of a casual, accidental observation.' 20 The Court therefore
turned to the second prong
of Katz, inquiring whether "Mr. Ciraolo's expecta121
tion was reasonable."'
The Court determined that:

117
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. "It was the officer's observation, not the photograph, that supported the warrant. [The officer affiant] testified that the photograph did not identify the marijuana
as such because it failed to reveal a 'true representation' of the color of the plants: 'you have to
see it with the naked eye."' Id. at 212 n.1 (citation omitted).
118
Id. at 209-10. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, and he pled guilty

to cultivation of marijuana. Id. at 210. The California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
aerial observations violated the Fourth Amendment because that backyard fell within the curtilage
of the home and the heights and existence of the two fences surrounding the yard constituted
"objective criteria from which [the court concluded that the defendant had] manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by any standard." Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d
1081, 1089 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)). The appellate court found
significant that the flyover "was not the result of a routine patrol conduct for any other legitimate
law enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this particular enclosure within [the defendant's] curtilage." Id. (citing Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App.
3d at 1089). The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for review. Id.
119
Id. at 211 ("Clearly - and understandably - [Mr. Ciraolo] has met the test of manifesting
his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.").
120
Id. at 211-12. The Court pointed out that the two fences could not shield the yard from all
observation:
Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a
policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus. Whether [Mr.
Ciraolo] therefore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from
all observations of his backyard, or whether instead he manifested merely a
hope that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely
clear in these circumstances.

Id.
121
Id. at 212 ("[T]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity, but instead 'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181-83)).
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The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some
views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a
public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities visibly clear. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub'
ject of Fourth Amendment protection."122
Because the observations by the two officers occurred in publicly navigable airspace and were physically noninstrusive, the Court held that Mr.
Ciraolo's expectation "that his garden was protected from such observation
is
1 23
unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor."
That the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying
the plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana
is irrelevant. Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced124down could have
seen everything that these officers observed.
The Supreme Court so concluded despite the fact that in 1967 Justice Harlan (in
Katz) likely did not consider "an aircraft [to be] within the category of future
'electronic' developments that could stealthily intrude upon an individual's pri, 125
vacy."
122

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351) (citation omit-

ted).
123

Id. at 213-14.

124

Id. The Court refused to draw a distinction between
police aircraft focusing on a particular home and police aircraft engaged in a
"routine patrol." ... Whether this is a rational distinction is hardly relevant,
although we find difficulty understanding exactly how [Mr. Ciraolo's] expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ when two airplanes pass
overhead at identical altitudes, simply for different purposes .... The fact that
a ground-level observation by police "focused" on a particular place is not different from a "focused" aerial observation under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 214 n.2.
125
Id. at 214-15.
Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he was resting on the reality that one
who enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his conversation is not
being intercepted. This does not translate readily into a rule of constitutional
dimensions that one who grows illicit drugs in his backyard is "entitled to assume" his unlawful conduct will not be observed by a passing aircraft - or by
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Two Recent Cases Predict Trouble Ahead - Riley and Bond

In Florida v. Riley, 126 police observed the interior of a greenhouse (of
which portions of the roof and sides were left open) in the defendant's backyard
from a helicopter at 400 feet. 127 A plurality of the Court - Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy - argued that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the greenhouse when observed by
police from lawfully navigable airspace, equating the case to Ciraolo.128 Despite the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy in his greenhouse (given
that the greenhouse could not be seen from ground level), the four Justices reasoned that the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be observed from above: "Any member of the public could
legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of
400 feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no
more." 29 The four Justices also noted that the 1' helicopter
did not interfere with
30
the defendant's "normal use of the greenhouse."
The five other Justices disagreed (O'Connor filed a concurrence, and
the other four dissented), phrasing the issue as whether the public used this airspace (as opposed to 1,000 feet above the greenhouse in a commercial plane)
with such regularity that a defendant could not have reasonably expected privacy with respect to observations made from that vantage point, namely 400 feet
above the greenhouse in a helicopter.13 1 Riley did not resolve the question of
a power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard. As Justice
Harlan emphasized, "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the
'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep
them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversation in the
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable."
Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
126

488 U.S. 445 (1989).

127

Id. at 447-48.

128

Id. at 449.

129

Id. at 451. Such a statement obviously disregards the impracticalities of the average person

going to the trouble of actually renting a helicopter and either having the skills to fly it himself or
hiring a pilot.
130

Id. at 452.

131
Justice O'Connor argued that the defendant had not met his burden on the issue, but she did
not agree with the plurality's reasoning and therefore only concurred in the judgment. Id. at 454.

Because there is reason to believe that there is considerable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley's expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation from
that altitude was not a reasonable one. However, public use of altitudes lower
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vantage point, nor the effect the five justices' inquiries132will have on future cases
involving observations such as those made in Ciraolo.
In Bond v. United States, 133 the Court held that a Border Patrol Agent's
"squeezing" of a passenger's piece of carry-on luggage did constitute a search
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.1 34 The Border Patrol Agent boarded the
bus to check the passengers' immigration status, and while moving his way
along the aisle squeezed the soft luggage in the overhead storage. 135 The agent
felt a "brick-like" object in the defendant's bag, which turned out to be a brick
of methamphetamine. 136 The Court disagreed with the government's reliance on
the plurality opinion in Riley, and held that while a passenger may expect her
bag to be touched and moved by other passengers and bus employees,
she does
137
not expect her luggage to be felt in "an exploratory manner."
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, asserted that this
type of "manipulation" was "entirely foreseeable" and "substantially similar" to
the same type of manipulation to which the luggage would have been otherwise
exposed by any random passenger on the bus. 138 Relying on the traditional
Katz analysis, Justices Breyer and Scalia argued that the defendant simply had
no reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to objects he "knowingly ex' 139
poses to the public."
Bond and Riley are instructive on two important points to the upcoming
Kyllo discussion. First, the five justices' inquiry in Riley into the frequency of
flights in the airspace above the defendant's home indicates a move away from
both past precedent-namely, Ciraolo and Dow Chemical-and a strict
Katz analysis. (This step away from Katz will be evident in the discussion infra
of the Kyllo opinion.) Second, the voting by Justice Scalia (who authored the
majority opinion in Kyllo) raises many questions, especially considering his
decision not to apply Katz to the Kyllo case but instead develop a new rule for
Fourth Amendment cases involving the use of sensory-enhancing technology on
than that - particularly public observations from helicopters circling the curtilage of a home - may be sufficiently rare that police surveillance from such
altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite compliance
with FAA air safety regulations.

Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132 See supra text and accompanying notes 111-125.
133 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
134

Id. at 338-39.

135

Id. at 335.

136

Id. at 336.

137
138

Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 340 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

139

Id. at 341 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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the home. Justice Scalia and the majority opted not to cite either of these cases
in the majority's opinion in Kyllo.' 4 These points (and more) will be elaborated
upon in the upcoming discussion of Kyllo.
III. KYLLO v. UNITED STATES - THE MAJORITY GOT IT WRONG

Despite the Supreme Court's rulings in earlier cases involving sensoryenhancing devices, the Court "[had] previously reserved judgment as to how
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception ... is too much" until
Kyllo v. United States.' 41 What follows is a discussion of the lower courts' rulings in the Kyllo case, and the Supreme Court's reversal.
A.

The CorrectOutcome - The Lower Courts' Holdings in Kyllo

In Kyllo, government agents parked across the street from the defendant's house around three o'clock in the morning, and used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the defendant's home. 142 "Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not
visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on
relative warmth - black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative
differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing
heat images. 1 43 The scan revealed that a portion of the defendant's home was
relatively hotter than the rest, which led the agents to believe that the defendant
was using halide lamps to grow marijuana plants. 44 A magistrate issued a
search warrant based upon the scan results, informants' tips1 45 and unusually

140 See Laurence A. Benner, et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October 2, 2000 - Septem-

ber 30, 2001), 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 87, 106-08 (2001) (discussing the change in Justice Scalia's
voting in Kyllo from the Bond and Riley cases).
141 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
142 Id. at 29-30. "The scan of Kyllo's home took only a few minutes and was performed from
the passenger seat of [the Agent's] vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also
from the street in back of the house." Id. at 30.
143

Id. at 29-30.

144

Id. at 30. "The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of [Kyllo's] home

were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than the neighboring homes in the triplex." Id.
145 See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999). As detailed in the Ninth
Circuit's opinion:
While investigating the activities of Tova Shook, the daughter of the task
force's original target, William Elliott ("Elliott"), an agent of the United States
Bureau of Land Management, an agent participating in the task force, began to
suspect Kyllo.
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high utility bills.146 Execution of the warrant revealed a complete marijuana
grow operation and more than 100 plants. 147 Kyllo entered a conditional plea to
one count of unlawfully manufacturing
marijuana after he unsuccessfully moved
48
to suppress the evidence seized.1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the intrusiveness of the thermal
imager. 149 On remand, the District Court made the following findings:
The AGEMA Thermovision 210 imaging device used by [the
agents] in the investigation of this case is a non-intrusive device
which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image
of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house. The
Oregon state law enforcement officers provided information to Elliott
that strengthened his suspicions. He was told that Kyllo and Luanne (Kyllo's
ex-wife) resided in one unit of a triplex, another unit of which was occupied
by Tova Shook and that a car registered jointly to Luanne and Kyllo parked at
the triplex. Elliott was also informed that Luanne had been arrested a month
before for delivery and possession of a controlled substance and that Kyllo
had once told a police informant that he and Luanne could supply marijuana.
Id.
Ky~lo, 533 U.S. at 30. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, after Elliott's suspicions began to
increase regarding Kyllo based upon his investigation, he "then subpoenaed Kyllo's utility records. Elliott compared the records to a spreadsheet for estimating average electrical use and
concluded that Kyllo's electrical usage was abnormally high, indicating a possible indoor marijuana grow operation." Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1043.
147
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
146

148

Id.

149

United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994). As the Ninth Circuit explained:
[t]his [Fourth Amendment] inquiry cannot be conducted in the abstract. We
must have some factual basis for gauging the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device, which depends on the quality and the degree of detail of information that it can glean. For example, our analysis will be affected by
whether, on the one extreme, this device can detect sexual activity in the bedroom, as Kyllo's expert suggests, or, at the other extreme, whether it can only
detect hot spots where heat is escaping from a structure.
The district court, however, held no evidentiary hearing and made no
findings regarding the technological capabilities of the thermal imagine device
used in this particular case. In particular, the court made no findings on the
device's ability to detect the shapes of heat-emitting objects inside a home.
Without explicit findings, we are ill-equipped to determine whether the use of
the thermal imaging device constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for findings
on the technological capacities of the thermal imaging device used in this
case.

Id. at 530-31.
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device was operated from the passenger seat of a vehicle parked
on the street. The device cannot and did not show any people or
activity within the walls of the structure....
The court finds that the use of the thermal imaging device here
was not an intrusion into Kyllo's home. No intimate details of
the home were observed, and there was no intrusion upon the
privacy of the individuals within the home. The device used
cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or
human activities. The device recorded only the heat being emitted from the home.' 50
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the thermal scan did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Ninth Circuit described the function of a
thermal imager as "detect[ing] energy radiated from the outside surface of objects, and internal heat that has been transmitted to the outside surface of an
object, which may create a differential heat pattern."' 5' The court detailed the
specific function of the AGEMA 210 as a device that "passively records thermal
emissions rather than sending out intrusive beams or rays - acting much like a
camera. A viewfinder then translates and displays the results to the human eye,
with the area around an object being shaded darker or lighter, depending on the
level of heat being emitted."'' 52 The Ninth Circuit noted that "[w]hile at first
used primarily by the military, thermal scanners have entered into law enforcement and civilian commercial use," which included applications such as
"checks for moisture in roofs, overloading power lines, and faulty building insu'
lation."153
Under the two-part Katz test, the Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo had no
subjective expectation of privacy because he had "made no attempt to conceal
these emissions, [which] demonstrat[ed] a lack of concern with the heat emitted
and a lack of a subjective privacy expectation in the heat."'' 54 "[T]he Agema
150 United States v. Kyllo, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 1996).
In his report, [the agent] state[d], in part: "On the 16th of Jan. the thermal scan
showed high heat loss from the roof of 878 Rhododendron above the garage
and from the wall facing 890 Rhododendon [sic] as shown in the two (2) diagrams below .... The center bldg. showed much warmer than the bids [sic]
on either side." [The agent] testified at the hearing that "[t]he main conclusion
that I reached was that there was definitely something unusual within the
structure that was generating that excess heat."

Id.
151 Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044.
152
Id.
153

Id. at 1044 n.4.

15

Id. at 1046.
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210's scan measured waste heat emissions that Kyllo had made no attempt to
conceal ... and that Kyllo had demonstrated
no subjective expectation of pri1 55
vacy in these emissions from the home."
The Ninth Circuit also held that even if Kyllo established a subjective
expectation of privacy, it was not one that society was prepared to recognize as
objectively reasonable. 56 The court acknowledged the heightened level of
Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home, 57 but noted that "activities
within a residence are not protected from outside, non-intrusive, governmental
observation, simply because they are within the home or its curtilage."' 158 The
court further explained that the use of technology to "enhance government surveillance [did] not necessarily turn permissible non-intrusive observation into
impermissible search."' 159 However, because technology was used to enhance
the government's observations, "the crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure
analysis, is whether the technology reveals 'intimate details."' 6° The Ninth Circuit concluded that the imager did not reveal intimate details of Kyllo's life:
The scan merely indicated amorphous "hot spots" on the roof
and exterior wall and not the detailed images of private activity
that Kyllo suggests the technology could expose. "Such information is neither sensitive nor personal, nor does it reveal the
specific activities within the ...home." Like the Court in Dow
Chemical, we reject Kyllo's attempt to rely on "extravagant
generalizations" about the potential invasions of privacy
that
16 1
this sort of advanced technology may someday present.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 1046-47.

157 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, A Man's Home is His Castle?: Reflections on the Home, The Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth And Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 175 (2002) (discussing the evolution of the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home).
158 Id. (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion); California v.

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
159 Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Dow Chemical v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986)).
16 IId. (citing United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238)).
161 Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit did add that "[wihile this
technology [i.e., the thermal emission scan] may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced
to the point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusive observation into
impermissible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts."
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The Majority's Decision in Kyllo

A majority of the Supreme Court (in a 5-4 decision) reversed the Ninth
Circuit and held that the information obtained by the thermal imager constituted
a search: "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."' 162 The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the issue, identifying the question as "whether the use of a thermalimaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." 163 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,' 64 first launched
162

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).

In

reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court likewise reversed five other Courts of Appeals that agreed
with the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1lth Cir. 1995); United
States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Cusumano,
67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that warrantless use of a thermal imager violated the
Fourth Amendment), vacated and decided on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). See generally Thueson, supra note 18, at 183-88 (discussing thermal imaging cases prior to
Kyllo).
163
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). Like so many cases, it boils down to how one
characterizes the issue. As will be argued infra, the issue should have been characterized as
whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect
relative amounts of heat radiatingfrom the home constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. And even more specifically, under Katz, the issue should have been framed
as whether Kyllo had an expectation of privacy in the temperature of the air immediately surrounding his home, and whether society was prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.
See, e.g., People v. Edwards, No. 4884/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 962, at *26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 21, 2001) (answering the question in the negative with regard to a canine sniff for drugs
because "a person does not have an expectation of privacy to the air outside one's automobile").
I64 Justice Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy, dissented. See Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 41-52 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). It goes without saying, Kyllo resulted in an odd configuration of justices. See, e.g., Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 n.8 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001)
(noting in Kyllo "the unusual ideological crossover of judges in the recent Supreme Court case
holding that a search warrant must be obtained before police may use thermal detectors. Justices
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer were in the majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy were in the minority."); see also, e.g., Michael E.
Raabe, After September 11, Where Will The U.S. Supreme Court Go?, 44 ORANGE Co. LAW. 22
March 2002 ("For the law public, the voting of the U.S. Supreme Court members on [Kyllo] was
implausible."); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting The Power Pagent Of The Justices, 86 MINN. L. REv. 131, 150 (2001); Richard Seamon, New
Technology Brings Up Old Question: The Fourth Amendment and the Issue of Search, 13 S.C.
LAW. 23, 24 Nov./Dec. 2001 [herinafter Seamon, New Technology] ("Although five-to-four decisions are common, the voting alignment in Kyllo was uncommon."); All-Seeing Eye, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 19, 2001, at 8A, available at 2001 WL 23568557 ("The Kyllo decision seems odd at first: The conservative Scalia wrote an opinion that would gladden the heart of a
modem civil libertarian, while the court's most liberal justice, John Paul Stevens, wrote a dissent
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into a lengthy discussion of Katz and the special privacy protections afforded to
a house and its curtilage.165 The majority disagreed with the Government's (and
the dissent's) argument that the imager detected "only heat radiating from the
external surface of the house,"' 166 or that information could be characterized as
"non-intimate" or merely "off-the-wall surveillance. ' 6 7 The majority explained
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained."'' 6' Rather, "all
details [of the home] are intimate details. . . . [D]etail[s] of how warm - or
even how relatively warm - [the defendant] was heating his residence" were
intimate details just by way of being details of the home. 69 Under Katz analysis, society has and continues to recognize a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. 170
C.

A Confusing New Rule and the Abandonment of Katz - The Kyllo
Majority Got It Wrong

Kyllo could have been such a simple case. It should have been a simple
case. The majority should have decided Kyllo on already established Fourth
Amendment precedent. Instead, the majority in Kyllo departed from the established Katz analysis, or at best took a huge step away from it, by adducing a new
7
rule
cases involving
and its use
a home.
Whatforresulted
from the sensory-enhancing
majority's opiniontechnology
was a confusing
and on
overly
broad

- joined by three conservatives - that criticizes the majority for its lack of judicial restraint in
trying to craft 'an all-encompassing rule for the future."'). One editorialist painted Justice Scalia
as a new comrade of the movement to legalize marijuana. See Froma Harrop, Commentary - The
Marijuana War Becomes a High-Tech Circus, THE PROVIDENCE J., June 24, 2001, available at
2001 WL 22618490.
165
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-33.
166

Id. at 35 (citing Government's Brief).

167

Id. at 35-39, 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's "off the wall" characterization was

in contrast to the dissent's distinction between "off the wall" and "through-the-wall" surveillance
that actually penetrates the walls of the home.
168
Id. at 37.
169

Id. (emphasis in original).

170

Id. at 40.

171 See Seamon, New Technology, supra note 164, at 25 ("[B]eneath the surface of Kyllo lies
evidence of a big change in Fourth Amendment law."); see also Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v.
United States and the PartialAscendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1013, 1029 (2001) [hereinafter Seamon, PartialAscendance] ("In short, when Kyllo is examined closely and in the context of the Court's jurisprudence, it is an important case not only because it departs from the ... Katz test, but also because it reinforces the narrowing of the once
broad warrant presumption .... ").
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rule that will plague the courts for years to come, 172 along with delaying the
local, state, and federal government's
use of important tools in the wars against
174
173
both drugs and terrorism.
1.

An Erroneous Analysis - The Majority Was "Ice Cold,"
Relatively Speaking

The majority did not apply the Katz rubric in its analysis of the thermal
imager, labeling the Katz test as "circular ....subjective and unpredictable.' 75
Justice Scalia cites himself for this proposition, 176 and failed to cite Riley 177 or
Bond,178 two cases in which Justice Scalia supported the application of established Fourth Amendment precedent. The perfect contradiction to the faults
identified by the majority of the two-pronged Katz inquiry is that under Katz it is
inconceivable that the government's use of the thermal imager in Kyllo could
172 See United States v. Huggins, 2002 WL 1792668, *2, *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2002) (revealing
authorities' need for two search warrants: one for the use of a thermal imager and a second for the
physical search of a residence).
173
See generally Stanley E. Adelman, Safe At Home, But Better Buckle Up on the Road -

Supreme Court Search and Seizure Decisions, 2000-2001 Term, 37 TULSA L. REv. 347, 384-85
(2001).
174
See Raabe, supra note 164, at 22-23 (wondering what shape Fourth Amendment law will
take following the tragic events of September 11, 2001); Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes
and Ears You Have: A New Regime For Covert Government Surveillance,70 FORDHAM L. REv.
1017, 1018-19 (2001) (predicting the changing attitude in America for increased technological
surveillance given the events of September 11); Christopher Woo & Miranda So, The Casefor
Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 521, 524, 538 (2002) ("In light of September 11, the balance may shift once again toward
favoring the use of new technologies without Fourth Amendment protections."). But see Edward
J. Cleary, Guardiansof Liberty, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (2001) (citing Kyllo and warning that
despite the events of September 11th, the country must not give up essential liberties).
175
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
176

Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling

the Katz test "notoriously unhelpful," "fuzzy," and "self-indulgent")); see also Seamon, New
Technology, supra note 164, at 25 ("In light of [Scalia's remarks regarding his dislike for the Katz
test], the Kyllo majority did not actually apply the Katz test to determine whether the thermal
imaging of Kyllo's home constituted a search. Instead, the majority found that the Katz test needs
to be 'refined' to determine whether the interior of a home has been searched.") (citing Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 34).
177
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (joining the plurality in finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a greenhouse situated in defendant backyard observed by police in a
helicopter 400 feet above ground); see supra text and accompanying notes 119-23; Benner, supra
note 140, at 106-08.
178
Bond, 529 U.S. at 340 (joining dissent in arguing that the squeezing of a passenger's baggage in an exploratory manner did not constitute a search because it was "entirely foreseeable"
and "substantially similar" to the manipulation engaged in by the general public); see also supra
text and accompanying notes 125-31; Benner, supra note 140, at 106-08.
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have ever fallen victim to the objective prong of the test. 17 9 The test's apparent
malleability could not stretch far enough to suit the majority, which may best
explain why the majority opted not to follow Katz and instead justify the formafor a new firm and bright rule regarding sensory-enhancing
tion of and need
80
technology.
Just how "bright" the rule is remains to be seen. 181 To justify the "not in
general public use" language of its rule, the majority cited Ciraolo.'82 However, the majority missed the distinction between Ciraolo and Kyllo, given that
Ciraolo involved simply observation from a vantage183point 1,000 feet above the
ground - no sensory enhancing device was at issue.
Certainly the use of technology to enhance human sensory capabilities
presents different and more serious issues than the use of technology to simply
provide a platform from which to make naked eye observations. The majority's
failure to distinguish between these two separate issues is made all the more
troubling by the failure to define "general public use." Indeed, this vague stanpoint that the Court
dard presents a mirror image of the issue regarding vantage
184
left unresolved with respect to vantage point in Riley.
179

See discussion infra Part III.C.2.

180

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; see also Seamon, New Technology, supra note 164, at 25:

181

The majority in Kyllo resorted to the common law in an attempt to establish a
floor of privacy protection. It remains to be seen how solid this floor will be.
Common law is a naturally moving target and even if the common law were
fixed and its content determinate, questions would remain about how to apply
it to surveillance techniques that could not have been imagined by common
law courts.
See discussion infra Part III.C.2.

182 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6:

183

The dissent argues that we have injected potential uncertainty into the constitutional analysis by noting that whether or not the technology is in general
public use may be a factor. The quarrel, however, is not with us but with this
Court's precedent. See Ciraolo, supra at 215 ("In an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected
from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet").
Given that we can quite confidently say that thermal imaging is not 'routine,'
we decline in this case to reexamine that factor.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 n.1 (1986) ("It was the officer's observation,

not the photograph, that supported the warrant. [The officer affiant] testified that the photograph
did not identify the marijuana as such because it failed to reveal a 'true representation' of the color
of the plants: 'you have to see it with the naked eye."') (citation omitted).
184 Benner, supra note 140, at 105-06. The four dissenting Justices and one concurring Justice
in Riley phrased the issue as whether the defendant could have reasonably expected privacy with
regard to observations made from 400 feet above the ground, when commercial airplanes fly at an
altitude of 1000 feet - leaving open the question of vantage point despite earlier cases like
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical. See supra notes 111-125 and accompanying text.
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The Kyllo majority also mischaracterized what the thermal imager actually revealed. The majority's emphasis on "intimate details" and "heat
within the home" obviously (and rightly so) raised red flags 185 - the constitutional sanctity of the home under the Fourth Amendment is neither a new concept nor something to be taken lightly. I8 6 But instead of tackling only those
facts presented by Kyllo which were immediately before it, 187 the majority constructed a smoke screen with its dramatic talk of the thermal imager revealing
such "intimate" details as the "hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath.' 88 In truth, the thermal imager used in Kyllo was widely
used. 189 Moreover, the imager was a crude piece of equipment that measured
Even the way the majority phrased the issue reveals this characterization of "inside" the
home: "This case presents the question whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
,search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 35 n.2.
186
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (holding that any physical penetration into the home "by even a fraction of an inch" constituted a violation). See generally Hafetz,
supra note 157 (discussing the evolution of the heightened Fourth Amendment protection afforded
to the home).
The dissent highlighted that it would not have chosen to "erect a constitutional impediment
187
185

to the use of sense-enhancing technology unless it provide[d] its user with the functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit agreed. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1046 ("Whatever the 'Star Wars' capabilities
this technology may possess in the abstract, the thermal imaging device employed here intruded
into nothing."). In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984), the Supreme Court highlighted the need for judicial restraint when it admonished that "[it had] never held that potential,
as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." (emphasis added). See also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5
(1986) ("Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant
generalizations.") (emphasis added); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 678 (Colo. 2001) (en banc)
(Kourlis J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court [in Kyllo] was primarily concerned about the revelation of
myriad intimate and private details that a thermal imager, and the prospective use of continually
advancing technology, could reveal.") (emphasis added); Thueson, supra note 18, at 201 (emphasizing that the majority should have exercised judicial restraint and not focused on yet-to-be developed technology).
The Ninth Circuit understood this, as well. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047 ("While this technology [i.e., the thermal emission scan] may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced to
the point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusive observation into impermissible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts.")
(emphasis added); Gregory S. Fisher, CrackingDown on Soccer Moms and Other Urban Legends
on the Frontierof the FourthAmendment: Is It Finally Time to Re-Define Searches and Seizures?,
38 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 137, 170-71 (2002) ("Kyllo leaves unanswered whether there should be
any distinction between the manner by which technology could be used and the manner by which
it is actually used in a given case.") (emphasis added).
18
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
189

It is unclear why the majority believed the thermal imager to be such an uncommon piece of

technology. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
The record describes a device that numbers close to a thousand manufactured
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only the relative amounts of heat that had emanated outside the home into the
public domain. 190 The "inferences"' 191 made from the results of the scan - in
units; that has a predecessor numbering in the neighborhood of 4,000 to 5,000
units; that competes with a similar product numbering from 5,000 to 6,000
units; and that is "readily available to the public" for commercial, personal, or
law enforcement purposes, and is just an 800- number away from being rented
from "half a dozen national companies" by anyone who wants one. Since, by
virtue of the Court's new rule, the issue is one of first impression, perhaps it
should order an evidentiary hearing to determine whether these facts suffice to
establish "general public use."
(citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit noted that "[w]hile at first used primarily by the military, thermal scanners have entered into law enforcement and civilian commercial use," which included applications
such as "checks for moisture in roofs, overloading power lines, and faulty building insulation."
Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044, 1044 n.4; see also Raabe, supra note 164, at 23 ("It should be noted that
these [thermal] imaging devices were widely available .. ").
Scientists and engineers widely use thermal imagers to monitor thermal anomalies. See,
e.g., NDT Update, Software: Thermovision Labview Toolkit, Sept. 1, 2001, availableat 2001 WL
12312475. The device is also widely used by fire departments all across the country. See, e.g.,
Paul Garber, ProsecutorSays Prints Match; Arson Trial Opens, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD,
Apr. 10, 2002 ("The [thermal] imager helps rescuers see through thick smoke and find victims by
using their body temperatures."); Lisa Coffey Majoney, Device is Lighter, Smaller and Cheaper It's Hot - Latest Imager Should Help FirefightersSave More Lives, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar.
1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4540659 ("Now with the help of new, cutting edge technology namely the Bullard T3 thermal imager - firefighters can see through smoke, cutting search time
by more than 75 percent and increasing their changes of saving lives."); Karl Kell, Association
Plants to Enhance Community, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 24, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 3085144
("Almost every other department on the north shore utilizes the thermal imagers, a device that has
been credited with helping to locate smoke inhalation victims and saving countless lives nationwide.").
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, thermal imagers have appeared all over the
country in state and local police and fire departments. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Silver, Federal Program ProvidesLocal Police High-Tech Access, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3815143 ("Police Officers from five states got a gander at gadgentry such as
thermal imagers" in an effort to increase the "benefit derived in the fight against terrorism by
having state and local law enforcement agencies well-equipped."); Amy De La Hunt, Charlack
Gets Hand-Held Thermal Imagerfor Police, ST. LOuIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 2556772; Robert E. Waldron, Fiscal 2003 Defense Request: Combating Terrorism
and Engineering, Congressional Testimony by Federal Document Clearing House, Apr. 10, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2012474 (documenting use of thermal imagers and other sensory-enhancing
devices in the war against terrorism in wake of September 11, 2001); Curt Weldom, Crisis Response Capability to Incidents of Domestic Violence, Congressional Testimony by Federal Document Clearing House, Mar. 5, 2002, available in 2002 WL 2011399 ("Significant and credible
new threats to public safety and security demand rapid implementation of technology developed
by any source. Civilian first responders suffer from a lack of access to current governmentdeveloped technologies, such as... thermal imagers... that can enhance their safety while at the
same time enable the expeditious location and rescue of victims of a terrorist incident.").
190
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 50-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
In fact, the device could not, and did not, enable its user to identify either the
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conjunction with the informants' tips and the utility bills were completely unfounded. "[T]he only conclusions that the officers reached concerning the interior of the home were at least as indirect as those that might have been inferred
from the contents of the discarded garbage, or pen register data, or, as in this
case, subpoenaed utility records."'' 92 It was quite an illogical and unprecedented
lady of the house, the rug on the vestibule floor, or anything else inside the
house, whether smaller or larger than 36 by 36 inches. Indeed, the vague thermal images of [Kyllo's] home that are reproduced in the Appendix were submitted by him to the District Court as part of an expert report raising the question whether the device could even take "accurate, consistence infrared images" of the outside of his house.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).
Also instructive on this point is the plurality's point in Riley, whereby the Justices supported
their holding (that the defendant had no reasonable expectation that his greenhouse would be
observed by police in a helicopter at 400 feet above) by noting that "[a]ny member of the public
could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and
could have observed Riley's greenhouse." Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989); see supra
Part II.D. It seems conceivable that it would be easier for a member of the general public to purchase a thermal imager on-line than it would be to purchase or rent a helicopter and then learn
how to fly it or hire a pilot. See supra Part II.D.
191 As one commentator so simply, and correctly, stated, "Any activity targeted toward a specific location necessarily yields information about that location." Fisher, supra note 187, at 169.
"[I]nformation 'regarding' the interior of a home apparently is not just information obtained
through its walls, but also information concerning the outside of the building that could lead to
(however many) inferences 'regarding' what might be inside." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Stevens explained, the thermal imager did not survey anything inside the
house, "[b]ut even if [it] could reliably show extraordinary differences in the amounts of heat
leaving his home, drawing the inference that there was something suspicious occurring inside the
residence - a conclusion that offices far less gifted than Sherlock Holmes would readily draw does not qualify as 'through-the-wail surveillance,' much less a Fourth Amendment violation."
Id. ("As noted, the Court effectively treats the mental process of analyzing data obtained from
external sources as the equivalent of a physical intrusion into the home. As I have explained,
however, the process of drawing inferences from data in the public domain should not be characterized as a search.").
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
192
(1988) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). Directly addressing the Court, Justice Stevens explained, "[allthough the Court credits us with the 'novel proposition that inference insulates a search,' our point simply is that an inference cannot be a search, contrary to the Court's
reasoning." Id. at 44 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court cited Karo for its proposition that an
inference can amount to an unconstitutional search. Id. at 36-37. However, as Justice Stevens
aptly pointed out:
Of course, Karo itself does not provide any support for the Court's view that
inferences can amount to unconstitutional searches. The illegality in that case
was "the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence" to obtain information
that "could not have [been] obtained by observation from outside," rather than
any thought processes that flowed from such monitoring.
Id. at 45 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the dissent then aptly (and albeit sarcastically) analogized:
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leap to equate the inferences made in Kyllo (and so similar to those made in
countless other cases) to the search of the interior
of a home - the majority con193
fused the effect with the purpose of the search.
The majority's goal to protect precious privacy rights associated with
the home was indeed laudable. No one could or would want to dispute this.
However, it was "pure hyperbole for the Court to suggest that refusing to extend
the holding of Katz to this case would leave the homeowner at the mercy of
'technology that could discern all human activity in the home."' 194 Unfortunately, the majority may have chipped away at the foundation of Fourth
95
Amendment protections by so limiting its new rule to the interior of the home,
and at the same time creating a blanket prohibition against the warrantless use of
Under [the Court's] expansive view, I suppose, an officer using an infrared
camera to observe a man silently entering the side door of a house at night
carrying a pizza might conclude that its interior is now occupied by someone
who likes pizza, and by doing so the officer would be guilty of conducting an
unconstitutional "search" of the home.
Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Thueson, supra note 18, at 198-201 (summarizing
majority's flawed analysis regarding inferences resulting from the use of the thermal imager in
Kyllo); Fisher, supra note 187, at 169:
Kyllo compounds this error by attaching undue significance to whether the
use of a technological device provides police with "any information" about
activities occurring inside a home, thereby resurrecting a physical access or
trespass approach previously thought to be dead-letter. Any activity targeted
toward a specific location necessarily yields information about that location.
Kyllo does not explain why its holding should not apply with equal force to
examining garbage left at the curbside or analyzing utility records, conduct
that also reveals information about activities that occurred inside a home.
193 Justices Breyer's and Scalia's dissent in Bond is instructive on this point. The Justices
noted that "in determining whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, it is the effect, and not
the purpose, that matter." Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 341 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer and Scalia went on to explain that, "[a] Fourth Amendment rule that turns on purpose
could prevent police alone from intruding where other strangers freely tread. And the added privacy protection achieved by such an approach would not justify the harm worked to law enforcement - at least that is what this Court's previous cases suggest." Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
194 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Benner, supra note 140, at 104 (remarking upon the "gateway left open for the
very erosion of rights Justice Scalia so ardently claims to protect."); Adelman, supra note 173, at
384 ("One still wonders, however, whether the expectation of privacy the Court so vigorously
protects here tends to vanish when one leaves home and hearth and ventures out into the world
outside."); Benner, supra note 140, at 107 ("A further question remains as to what impact Kyllo
will have on the use of technology outside the home."); Fisher, supra note 187, at 169-170
("Kyllo's emphasis on privacy values associated with private homes is sound, indeed reassuring;
but by anchoring its analysis to a physical location - the home - the Court seemingly created a
rule at odds with the long-recognized principle that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."') Would the result have been different if the structure was an office building, leased
storage, or other facility?
195
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(likely) all sensory-enhancing technology that may lead to inferences such as
those made in Kyllo. Unbridled police discretion is fundamentally wrong, but
[s]omething seems equally wrong when police are forbidden
from monitoring a location, even one imbued with constitutional significance, to detect activities or characteristics associated with that location just because they happen to use a technological device, and when their monitoring does not otherwise
reveal any specific, discrete
information about activities occur196
ring inside the location.
196

Fisher, supra note 187, at 166. The Kyllo dissent would have obviously agreed:
Notwithstanding the implications of today's decision, there is a strong public
interest in avoiding constitutional litigation over monitoring of emissions from
homes, and over the inferences drawn from such monitoring. Just as "the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public," so
too public officials should not have to avert their senses or their equipment
from detecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat, traces
of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify hazards to the community. In my
judgment, monitoring such emissions with "sense-enhancing technology" and
drawing useful conclusions from such monitoring, is an entirely reasonable
public service.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Kyllo produced many immediate results, as well. Several district courts granted motions to
suppress once the thermal imaging results were expunged from the affidavits used to obtain search
warrants. See United States v. Holmes, 175 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71 (D. Maine 2001) ("[Alfter expunging the information obtained from the thermal imaging device, the Court concludes that there is
insufficient evidence to support probable cause of the issuance of a warrant."), motion for reconsideration granted, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2207 (D. Maine February 11, 2002) (affirming previous order granting defendant's motion to dismiss); Connecticut v. Mordowanec, 788 A.2d 42, 5354 (Conn. 2002) (deciding that there was probable cause without the results of the thermal scan of
the defendant's commercial property and therefore did not need to reach the issue of whether
Kyllo applied to commercial property); People v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 11 (Idaho Ct. App.
2001). Other courts remanded the cases to the district courts for probable cause determinations.
See United States v. Depew, 17 Fed. Appx. 563, 563-64, (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001); United States v.
Real Property Located at 15324 County Highway, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19837 (7th Cir. Aug. 9,
2001); see also Johnson v. State, 2002 WL 563609, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. April 17, 2002)
(remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the police illegally focused or
intensified their investigation with the illegal use of thermal imaging despite the fact that the
Magistrate who issued the search warrant was unaware of the officers' thermal imaging of the
defendant's warehouse).
Some courts, however, denied motions to suppress, finding that even after the results of the
thermal imagers were expunged, enough evidence remained to establish probable cause to search
the residences at issue. See United States v. Woodward, 173 F. Supp. 2d 64, 65, 70-71 (D. Maine
2001) (concluding that the affidavit established probable cause despite the expunged results of the
thermal scan given the confidential informant's information, corroboration of the confidential
informant's information). And a few courts allowed the thermal imaging scan results to remain
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2. Kyllo Should Have Been a Simple Case Under "Red Hot" Katz
The majority in Kyllo should have decided the case based on the facts of
Kyllo alone using established Fourth Amendment principles, and held that the
warrantless use of the thermal imager did not constitute an illegal search under
Katz and its progeny. 197 The issue should have been characterized as whether
the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street
to detect relative amounts of heat radiatingfrom the home constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 198 And even more specifically,
under Katz, the ultimate issues are whether Kyllo had an expectation of privacy
in the contemporaneous temperature of the air immediately surrounding his
home, and whether society was prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.' 99
The Supreme Court in Katz deemed the warrantless use of a listening
device attached to the outside of the phone booth to intercept the content of
communications made within the phone booth - hence, through the wall conversation - an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. 2° In
Kyllo, the thermal
imager did not reveal images of or communicationsfrom in20 1
side the home.

because they were obtained in good faith reliance on prior decisions before the Supreme Court
decided the Kyllo case. See State v. Formaro, 252 Wis. 2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Loranger, 640 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. App. 2001).
197
See sources cited supra note 176. In agreement with the thesis of this article, the dissent
argued that the facts and circumstances of the Kyllo case could have been solved within already
established Fourth Amendment precedent, and did not need the Court to fashion a new rule.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Troy J. LeFevre, Comment, Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: Supreme Court Adresses Advances in Technology and Rules
that Thermal Imaging Devices May Not Be Used Without a Search Warrant,78 N.D. L. REv. 99,
119 (2002) ("The broad holding of Kyllo makes it one of the most important Fourth Amendment
cases in years because it may include some equipment unlikely to offend even the most privacyminded persons.").
198
The Ninth Circuit correctly identified the issue. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041,
1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
199
See, e.g., People v. Edwards, No. 4881/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 962, at *26 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 21, 2001) (answering the question in the negative with regard to a canine sniff for drugs
because "a person does not have an expectation of privacy to the air outside one's automobile.").
200
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
201

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979):
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a
pen register whether a commuiication existed. These devices do not hear
sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed - a
means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.

(citation omitted); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (emphasizing that "the
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Surely, there is a significant difference between the general and
well-settled expectation that strangers will not have direct access to the contents of private communications, on the one
hand, and the rather theoretical expectation that an occasional
homeowner would even care if anybody noticed the relative
amounts
of heat emanating from the walls of his house, on the
20 2
other.
Under Katz and its progeny of cases, it is clear from the record that Mr.
Kyllo did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emanating
from his home - he took no precautions, such as adding extra insulation, and it
surely could not have come as a surprise that his residence was emitting heat.20 3
And even if one were to believe that Mr. Kyllo did have a subjective expectation
of privacy in the heat emission, it is unthinkable to believe that it was an interest
that society was willing to accept as reasonable. 2°
The majority made its greatest error when it chose not to recognize the
distinction of "constitutional magnitude" 20 5 between "through-the-wall surveil-

beeper was [not] used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the [container]
within the [home], or in any way that would not have been visible.., from outside the [home.]");
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986):

202

[T]he photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced
somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and
record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets
would raise very different and far more serious questions; other protections
such as trade secret laws are available to protect commercial activities from
private surveillance by competitors.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

203

See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (finding a subjective expectation

of privacy where defendant had surrounded his marijuana patch with a six-foot outer fence and a
ten-foot inner fence).
204
With regard to whether society would ever find a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
residence's heat emissions, Justice Stevens characterized the countervailing privacy interest (to
the strong public interest in constitutional monitoring by police) as "trivial" at best. Ky~lo, 533
U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). "[I]t does not seem to me that society will suffer from a rule
requiring the rare homeowner who both intends to engage in uncommon activities that produce
extraordinary amounts of heat, and wishes to conceal that production from outsiders, to make sure
that the surrounding area is well insulated." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) ("The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation,
however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities.")).
205 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lance ' '2°6 and inferences made from information that was in the public domain.20 7 The Supreme Court has never stretched the Fourth Amendment to protect information voluntarily exposed to the public. °8 The imager at issue in
Kyllo revealed nothing more than the relative amounts of heat already released
into the public domain which had emanated out of the three residences in the
triplex, presenting a factual distinction from Katz and making it more akin to the
206

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
All that the infrared camera did in this case was passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of [Kyllol's home; all that those measurements
showed were relative differences in emission levels, vaguely indicating that
some areas of the roof and outside walls were warmer than others. As still images from the infrared scans show, no details regarding the interior of
[Kyllo]'s home were revealed.

Id. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207
Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One of those core principles, of course, is that searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. But it is equally
well settled that searches and seizures of property in plain view are presumptively reasonable. Whether that property is residential or commercial, the basic principle is the same: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." That is the principle implicated here.
Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). As Justice Stevens further elaborated:
Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to
notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is vented, as was
the case here. Additionally, any member of the public might notice that one
part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.
Such use of the senses would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, an adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property to verify her
perceptions with a sensitive thermometer. Nor, in my view, does such observation become an unreasonable search if made from a distance with the aid of
a device that merely discloses that the exterior of one house, or one area of the
house, is much warmer than another. Nothing more occurred in this case.
Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
208
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.");
see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-42 (1988) (in holding that inspection of garbage bags placed on curb of defendant's home did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court emphasized that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
744 (1979) ("When he used his phone, [Mr. Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business. In so doing, [he] assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers
he dialed."); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 344, 340-41 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justice Scalia); supra Part II. (discussing Katz and its progeny).
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open fields, 2° plain view,210 and plain smell 21' doctrines.2 12 Given the limited
nature of the thermal scanner at issue in Kyllo,2 13 and the fact that this truly was
209

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-84 (1984) (holding no reasonable expecta-

tion of privacy existed in an open field despite the fact that the said field was a part of the defendant's property and that the defendant had opted to grow his patches of marijuana in a secluded
portion of the field surrounded by woods, chicken wire, and "No Trespassing" signs); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (placing Dow's complex somewhere
between two extreme doctrines - the curtilage doctrine and the "open fields" doctrine - but determining that it lacked "critical characteristics" of each; in dismissing Dow's argument that its
complex fell within the "industrial curtilage," the Court emphasized that the search at issue did not
involve any physical entry and that Dow, unlike the precautions it had taken against ground surveillance, had done nothing to protect against aerial surveillance despite its close proximity to an
airport); see also supra Part U. (discussing Katz and its progeny).
210
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (holding that beeper placed in drum
to trace the movement of the defendant did not constitute a search, the Court found that "[tihe fact
that the officers in [the] case relied not only on visual surveillance, but on the use of the beeper to
signal the presence of [the defendant's] automobile to the police receiver" did not affect the analysis under Katz); Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238 ("The photographs here are not so revealing
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give EPA more
detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an outline of the facility's
buildings and equipment.")
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken
measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
211
See United States v. Showalter, 858 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1988) (officers' "olfactory observations" would not be suppressed unless a showing was made that they were not legally on the
premises); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) ("If the presence of odors is
testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one
sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis
insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character."); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997)
("Just as evidence in the plain view of officers may be searched without a warrant, evidence in the
plan smell may be detected without a warrant.") (citations omitted).
As the dissent in Kyllo explained,
[T]he notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling is a private
matter implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment (the test of which
guarantees the right of the people "to be secure in their.., houses" against unreasonable searches and seizures (emphasis added)) is not only unprecedented
but also quite difficult to take seriously. Heat waves, like aromas that are
generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A subjective expectation that they
would remain in private is not only implausible but also surely not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
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a case of "off-the-wall surveillance, ' 2 14 the majority should have affirmed the
Ninth Circuit and deemed the government's warrantless use of the thermal
imager constitutional under Katz and its lineage of resulting cases.
The fact that this investigation involved a piece of sense-enhancing
equipment would not undermine this conclusion, given the fact that the Court
had on many previous occasions approved the use of such technology.2 5 The
Court said in Knotts in 1983, "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them., 216 The majority in Kyllo failed to explain why such a statement should no longer ring true.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212
Had Kyllo been correctly decided, the "plain heat" doctrine may have been quick to follow.
213

Adelman, supra note 173, at 353 ("In view of the incremental constrictions on the exclusionary rule that have occurred over the years ....the Kyllo decision qualifies as a bit of a surprise, especially given the fairly minimal degree of actual intrusion that occurred in that case, and
as a reassurance to as least some skeptics that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, if
not totally alive and well, are still breathing inside the walls of our nation's houses.") (emphasis
added); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) ("Neither is there any intimation here
that the helicopter interfered with respondent's normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of
the curtilage.").
214
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979) (finding that the fact that the

telephone company had advanced technologically over the years to be unpersuasive: "[Mr. Smith]
concedes that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone company had decided to automate."); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282, 284 ("Nothing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them." As the
Court further explained, "[ilnsofar as respondent's complaint appears to be simply that scientific
devices such as the beeper enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has
no constitutional foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality,
and we decline to do so now."); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986)
("The photographs at issue in this case are essentially like those commonly used in mapmaking.
Any person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate them. In common with
much else, the technology of photography [and flight have] changed in this century. These developments have enhanced industrial processes, and indeed all areas of life; they have also enhanced
law enforcement techniques."); id. at 239 ("The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems."); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986); see also Fisher, supra note 177, at 166:

216

Something seems equally wrong when police are forbidden from monitoring
a location, even one imbued with constitutional significance, to detect activities or characteristics associated with that location just because they happen
to use a technological device, and when their monitoring does not otherwise
reveal any specific, discrete information about activities occurring inside the
location.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. The Court did note that there was "no indication that the beeper

was used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the [container] within the
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3.

The Confusion and Unanswered Questions Left Behind by the
Majority's "Firm" and "Bright" Rule

The rule promulgated by the majority (along with being unnecessary),2 17
has generated many questions and much confusion that will proceed to plague
the courts for years to come.21 8 What did the majority mean by "general public
use? ' 219 Will the Fourth Amendment protection disappear as soon as the tech[home], or in any way that would not have been visible ... from outside the [home]." Id. at 285.
But in that same discussion, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the police's use of the
beeper despite the fact that the beeper was used to reveal the location of the drum in the defendant's home:
We think that [defendant]'s contentions, [and the language used by the Court
of Appeals regarding the sanctity of the respondent's residence], to some extent lose sight of the limited use which the government made of the signals
from this particular beeper. As we have noted, nothing in this record indicates
that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that
the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest
on [defendant]'s premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of the
failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when
they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked
eyes. But scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues
which visual surveillance would not also raise.
Id. at 284-85.
217
See Seamon, New Technology, supra note 164, at 24:
The majority wanted to adopt a rule that would "take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development." In addition, the
majority wanted a rule that "assures preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."
Those forward-looking and backward-looking impulses accord with Justice
Scalia's often-expressed desire that the Court announce "bright line" rules
that both guide law eniorcement and reflect the original understanding of the
Fourth Amendment.
see also Fisher, supra note 177 (discussing Kyllo in the context of proposing a four-part test based
on existing concepts of the Fourth Amendment in order to restore the credibility of the Fourth
Amendment).
218
See Seamon, PartialAscendance, supra note 171, at 1020 ("Future litigation in lower courts
will probably focus on the meaning, rather than the derivation, of the majority's rule."); see also
Sarilyn E. Hardee, Note, Why the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United States
is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionalityof Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 53, 6870 (2001) (identifying a list of many of these same, unanswered questions resulting from the majority's rule in Kyllo).
219
See, e.g., Thueson, supra note 18, at 192-96 (discussing the vagueness of the "general public use" language); Fisher, supra note 187, at 166, 169 ("The assumption that police use of technological devices should be limited only to the extent that private homes are involved and the device
is not in 'general public use' seems problematic ....
The Court's reliance on whether a senseenhancing device was 'in general public use' is regrettable because the Court made no effort to
explain or define this concept or to relate it to technology use."); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
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Should courts consider only how the de-

vice was used in a particular case, or determine the constitutionality of the device's use based upon the ways and manner it could potentially be used or come

Amendment as a "Big Time" TV Fad, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 265, 277-78 (2001) ("The dissenters'
most telling blow concerns the majority's 'not in general public use' qualification, rightly condemned [by the dissent]"); see supra note 189 (discussing the prevalence of the thermal imager
both currently and at the time of the Kyllo); Benner, supra note 140, at 95 ("The [Kyllo] opinion's
cryptic attempt to limit its rationale to technology that is 'not in general public use' is also a troubling indication of the narrowness of this decision."); see also Joie M.B.C. Yuen, Casenotes,
Kyllo v. United States: The Warrantless Use of Thermal Imagery Devices, And Why the Public
Use StandardProves Unworkable, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 383, 404 (2001).
A Virginia Court of Appeals looked at this language when it applied Kyllo to an officer's
use of his cell phone. Commonwealth v. Terry, 2002 WL 1163449 (Va. Ct. App. June 4, 2002).
Investigating the robbery of a cell phone, the officer was granted entry into a suspect's home. Id.
at *1. The officer then used his cell phone to dial the number of the stolen cell phone. Id. The
officer heard the distinctive ring of the stolen cell phone (as had been earlier described to him by
the victim of the robbery) and obtained a search warrant using this information. Id. The lower
court had ruled that the officer's use of his cell phone to locate the contraband constituted an
illegal search. Id. The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed and held that, under Kyllo, the officer's
use of his cell phone did not constitute a search: "The act of dialing a cell phone did not constitute
the type of conduct proscribed in Kyllo v. United States. When dialing his cell phone, the officer
did not use sense enhancing technology not in 'general public use' to obtain information from
within a home." Id. at *2.
220 See Douglas Adkins, Note, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment "General
Public Use" Standardfor Emerging Technologies But Fails to Define It: Kyllo v. United States,
27 U. DAYTON L. REv. 245, 255-56 (2002) (explaining the potential meanings of "general public
use."). As Justice Stevens aptly pointed out, "the contours of [the Court's] new rule are uncertain
because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is in 'general use' how does a court faced with advanced technology on the horizon even know when a sensoryenhancing device has reached 'general public use?"' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Fisher, supra note 187, at 169 ("Technology continues to evolve at a rapid rate.
Today's novelty is tomorrow's sales special at a local hardware store or department store. Weekend fishers angling for their favorite sports fish may now employ hand-held sonar devices; cars
are equipped with global positioning systems; night vision goggles, once found only in the military, are now inexpensive and widely used. Devices or instruments that may be obscure today
may be widespread and commonly available in a few years. Thus, relying on concept of 'general
public use' offers individuals' privacy rights no assured protection against government use of
invasive technology."); LaFave, supra note 219, at 278 ("The dissenter's most telling blow concerns the majority's 'not in general public use' qualification, rightly condemned as 'somewhat
perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use
of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.' Scalia's attempts to deflect the criticism
by correctly noting that the limitation comes from 'this Court's precedent,' but having said that
appears to concede a need on some future occasion 'to reexamine that factor.' I'd say that is
definitely the case .... ); Benner, supra note 140, at 107 ("If a citizen's privacy in her conversations or other activities conducted entirely indoors is lost whenever it is reasonably foreseeable
that members of the public could use a new form of technology to invade that privacy, then it will
simply be a matter of time before what is available at your local Radio Shack will determine the
scope of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment against government snooping.").
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to be used? 22' Does Kyllo protection apply when a sensory-enhancing
device is
222
used to investigate a place or object other than a home?
Lower courts have already expressed their confusion over the Kyllo
22
holding. 3 In Michigan v. Katz, 2 4 two legitimate interpretations of the Kyllo
rule were identified, in the context of night-vision goggles - one in which observing light emanations outside a house with the use of the goggles would not
constitute a search because it did not intrude inside the home; and the other
whereby any observation of a light emanation with a sensory-enhancing piece of
technology would always constitute a search.225 In addition, courts have ques-

221

See Fisher, supra note 187, at 170-71.

222

See United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638 (2002) (questioning Kyllo's reach when thermal
imaging is used on a building which houses a business); see also Michael R. Stahlman, New Developments in Search and Seizure: More Than Just a Matter of Semantics, 2002 ARMY LAW. 31,
36 (May 2002) (asking "[w]hat impact does Kyllo have on law enforcement activity outside a
home?").
223
Two recent state courts have misstated the Kyllo holding, applying it in a Katz-like manner.
See State v. Miller, 647 N.W.2d 348, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., concurring) (addressing a canine sniff conducted on the outside of a car, the concurrence argued that under Kyllo,
individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around their cars); Porter v.
State, Nos. 807627, 805407, 854498, 2002 WL 1041005, at *2, *3 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 23,
2002) ("For Fourth Amendment purposes, a 'search' does not occur . . . unless a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in the object of the challenged search .... [T]he use of a thermal
imaging device to record the heat being emitted from within a home is a 'search' because it can
reveal information about legal activity inside the home as to which individuals have a legitimate
expectation of privacy.") (citing Kyllo, 121 S.Ct. at 2046)).
See also generally Thueson, supra note 18, at 192-202 (concluding that majority's rule was
unnecessarily overly broad); LaFave, supra note 208, at 278 ("Scalia's attempts to deflect the
criticism (of the overly broad rule) by correctly noting that the limitation comes from 'this Court's
precedent,' but having said that appears to concede a need on some future occasion 'to reexamine
that factor.' I'd say that is definitely the case..."); Michigan v. Katz, No. 224477, 2001 WL
1012114, at *2-*6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2001) (Whitbeck, J., concurring) ("I view Justice
Scalia as one of the cleanest writers in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Here [in
Kyllo], however, I must admit that I have some difficulty following his reasoning.")
224
2001 WL 1012114 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4,2001).
225

Id. at *2-*6. As Judge Whitbeck, in discussing the constitutionality of the government's use

of night vision binoculars, explained:
At issue, then, is whether Kyllo, which the United States Supreme Court decided after the trial court made its decision in this matter, now requires the
night vision binoculars evidence to be disregarded. I submit that Kyllo, as applied to the facts of this case, does not require such a result. Under the first
possible reading of Justice Scalia's majority opinion, using the night vision
binoculars involved no intrusion into the Vines Road property. While the intense light may have "emanated" from the house, at the time that Officer
Woods observed it, the light was outside the house. The fact that the night vision binoculars enhanced Officer Woods' ability to perceive this light would,
it seems to me, make no difference in the analysis.
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tioned the application of Kyllo to cases not involving technology, but other
226
sense-augmenting devices - specifically the use of dogs to "sniff' for drugs.

Under the second possible reading of Justice Scalia's majority opinion,
"emanations" from the house would be covered. However, it is clear that Officer Woods did not, in any fashion, use the night vision binoculars to "measure" the light emanating from the house. Rather, he simply used the night vision binoculars to perceive, or to enhance his perception of, that light. Unlike
the agents' use of the Thermovision device in Kyllo, Officer Woods did not
use the night vision binoculars to compare various areas of the house with
other houses. Nor did the binoculars give him any information about the relative intensity of the light emanating from different areas in the house. While
the night vision binoculars may have enhanced Officer Woods' visual surveillance, it was still simply visual surveillance. Therefore, I conclude that the
technological aspects of the governmental activity in this case are sufficiently
distinct from the facts of Kyllo to conclude that Kyllo does not bind this
Court's decision. Irrespective of which interpretation of Justice Scalia's Kyllo
opinion is more accurate in this instance, the magistrate did not err when he
considered the evidence gathered with the night vision binoculars when determining whether to issue the search warrant for the Vines Road property.

Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court has also taken a crack at summarizing the rule in Kyllo.
Connecticut v. Mordowanec, 788 A.2d 48, 54 (Conn. 2002) ("In Kyllo . . the [C]ourt held that
where a thermal imaging device reveals details of a 'private home' that would have been unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [F]ourth [Almendment search and is presumptively unreasonable without a search warrant.").
226
The Western District of Louisiana identified this risk:
The recent decision of Kyllo appears to run counter to the analytical basis of
the "dog sniff' rule. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court held that the use of senseenhancing technology which measures the heat emanating from the exterior of
a home constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the use of this technology is a search because the device allows the
Government to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion. Like the heat-detecting device in
Kyllo, a dog's nose is able to detect the presence of drugs and explosives
which would be unknowable without physical intrusion. Neither the device in
Kyllo nor a dog's nose injects anything into the area of privacy; both are dependent upon invisible elements - molecules or heat - emanating from the
place being investigated. The analytical contradiction was alluded to in Justice Steven's dissent in Kyllo, where he argued that the majority's ruling was
too broad. Because the instant case can be disposed on other grounds - the
unreasonable length of the Terry stop, and this issue need not be further explored.
United States v. Richard, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14104, at *17 n.4 (W.D. Lou. Aug. 17, 2001)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 671 n.2 (Colo. 2001) likewise identified the same problem. Although it over-stated the already broad holding of Kyllo, the
court in Haley used Kyllo as support for its holding that a canine sniff conducted on an automobile
constituted a search despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Place: "We observe that
the United States Supreme Court has held that exploration of the details of a private home from
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This is just the tip of the iceberg. Kyllo is a very young case. As will be
seen in the ensuing years, the majority not only came to the wrong conclusion in
it also created a lot of additional work for itself and the lower
Kyllo, 2 but
27
courts.

IV. KYLLO'S AFTERMATH - THE TENUOUS FUTURE OF ION SCAN TECHNOLOGY

In United States v. Charles,228 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit was faced with new sensory-enhancing technology used by the

outside of it, utilizing a sensing device, is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. In our
view, the logic of this holding undercuts the prosecution's argument that dog sniffs of the outside
of an automobile to detect the contents thereof do not fall within a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. (citing Kyllo). The Colorado Supreme Court held that "[b]ased on [its] precedent under
the Colorado Constitution, [it] conclude[d] that a dog sniff search of a person's automobile in
connection with a traffic stop that is prolonged beyond its purpose to conduct a drug investigation
intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a search and seizure requiring
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 672; see also State v. Miller, 647 N.W.2d 348,
355 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., concurring) (addressing a canine sniff conducted on the
outside of a car, the concurrence argued that Kyllo overruled prior state precedent that individuals
have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around their cars).
A New York trial court also compared a canine sniff to the facts of the Kyllo case, but held
that due to the lowered expectation of privacy associated with a car (as opposed to one's home)
and the fact that "a person does not have an expectation of privacy to the air outside one's automobile," the court upheld the canine sniff. People v. Edwards, No. 4881/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 962, at *26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 2001); see also State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328,
334-35 (Iowa 2001) ("We find that this holding [in Kyllo] does not disturb the nearly twenty years
of precedent regarding dog sniffs and vehicles."); Haley, 41 P.3d at 677-81 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (noting that Kyllo expressed concerns not at issue in Haley).
The Kyllo dissent identified this potential risk, as well. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent feared that the Court's new rule might include "mechanical substitutes"
for drug-sniffing dogs. Id. at 47. Despite the Court's holding in Place making canine sniffs constitutional because a dog sniff "disclosed only the presence or absence of narcotics," the Court's
new rule would make a mechanical equivalent unconstitutional: "Nevertheless, the use of such a
device would be unconstitutional under the Court's rule, as would the use of other new devices
that might detect the odor of deadly bacteria or chemicals for making a new type of high explosive, even if the devices (like the dog sniffs) are 'so limited in both the manner in which they'
obtain information and 'in the content of the information' they reveal. If nothing more than that
sort of information could be obtained by using the devices in a public place to monitor emissions
from a house, then their use would be no more objectionable than the use of the thermal imager in
this case." Idtat 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983)).
227 See Seamon, New Technology, supra note 164, at 25 ("The majority in Kyllo resorted to the
common law in an attempt to establish a floor of privacy protection. It remains to be seen how
solid this floor will be. Common law is a naturally moving target and even if the common law
were fixed and its content determinate, questions would remain about how to apply it to surveillance techniques that could not have been imagined by common law courts.").
228
29 Fed. Appx. 892 (3d Cir. 2002).
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government, the "ion scan., 2 29 The ion scan is a device which tests for traces of
drugs, chemical toxins, and explosives in a matter of seconds with minimal intrusion. 230 The court, in its "not for publication' '231 opinion, found other grounds
on which to affirm the lower court and opted not to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the government's use of the ion scan on a private residence without a search warrant.23 2 But the question of the ion scan's fate, in the aftermath
of Kyllo, will soon reach courtrooms,233 leaving one to ponder whether the ion
An ion scan "tests only for particles, not vapor, but uses ion-mobility spectrometry (measuring different speeds of charged particles) to identify any nine drugs in four seconds." Peter J.
Bober, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 75, 114 n. 276 (1997) (citing Anne Underwood, Smart Weapons for the War on Drugs, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1992, at 7); see also Melanie Cooper, Desperately Seeking Charlie, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23234788, ("Ion
scanners are the size of a small fridge .... Drug samples are put in a cell in the ion scanner and
vaporized. The time it takes for the particles to drift from one end of the cell to the other identifies
the drug ....
It's like being able to taste a crushed Tic Tac in an Olympic-sized swimming
pool."); Michael P. Regan, Spectrometers Are Fine, Dogs' Noses Divine, DESERET NEWS, Nov.
28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 30047558 ("Devices like Barringer's Ionscan can identify particles as small as one-billionth or one-trillionth of a gram, putting them in the same league as a good
bomb-sniffing dog.").
230
Barringer Technologies, Inc., available at http://www.barringer.com (last visited May 1,
2002). Barringer Technologies produces the "ion scan" and advertises it as useful in detecting
explosives and drugs. Id. The "ion scan" comes in a handheld wand version, other versions
which appear to be the size of a breadbox, and the largest version being the walk-through portals
used in airports. Id. Barringer also produces infrared technology, as well. Barringer was acquired by Smiths Group in 2001. See Instruments Business Outlook, Airport Security Systems:
Tragedy Spurs Demand (Sept. 30, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 17197297.
231 See 3D CIR. R. 28.0 (regarding the publication and citation of unpublished opinions); see
also Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the JudicialPower to 'Unpublish' Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 135 (2001).
232
Charles,29 Fed. Appx. at 896-98.
229

233

A handful of courts have addressed the use of the ion scan in the context of prisons. All of
the cases arose before the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo, and none addressed the device's
legality under the Fourth Amendment outside of the prison setting. A New Jersey Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the ion scan used to search visitors to New Jersey prisons for
drugs. See Jackson v. Dep't of Corrections, 762 A.2d 255, 258-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000). A prison inmate (as opposed to a prison visitor subjected to an ion scan) brought the case
in Jackson. Id. at 256-57. Under a "special needs" analysis, the New Jersey Superior Court held
that the special security needs of a prison outweighed a citizen's right to unfettered visitation of a
prisoner and to a prisoner's right to visitors. Id. at 259.
Similarly, a Florida Court of Appeals held that an ion scan did not constitute a "drug test"
under a Florida statute - which required that employees be tested for drug use only upon reasonable suspicion - because of the limited nature of the ion scan and the statute's purpose in using
the device, which was to prevent employees from being subjected to unwarranted and intrusive
drug testing requiring samples of body fluids and tissues. See Mitchell v. Dep't of Corrections,
675 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
The ion scan has appeared in other contexts, as well. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the
admissibility of ion scan results in a criminal trial, remanding the case to the District Court with
the instruction that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applied to the results of technical devices under
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scan (as well as other technology) 234 will suffer the same (unfair and unnecessary) fate as the thermal imager.
A.

The Facts of United States v. Charles

Upon receiving an anonymous tip that the occupant of a residence in St.
Croix was growing marijuana in her home, members of the Virgin Islands High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force surveilled the property over a two-

the Daubert analysis. See United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 999 (11th Cir. 1994). On remand,
the District Court admitted the results of the ion scan. See Ezenwa v. Gallen, 906 F. Supp. 978,
988 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (parties assert that Southern District of Florida, upon remand, did admit
results of ion scan). The Middle District of Pennsylvania held in a civil rights case that the defendants, for purposes of qualified immunity analysis, could not argue that it was reasonable to rely
on the uncorroborated results of an ion scan analysis in executing a search warrant. Id. at 987-88.
The Western District of New York held that enough facts existed to meet the pleading requirements of Rule E(2) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims in a
forfeiture action where a customs agent corroborated a drug dog's positive alert with ion scan
analysis which revealed cocaine residue. See United States v. $94,010.00 U.S. Currency, 1998
WL 567837, at *3 (W.D. N.Y. Aug. 21, 1998).
While the use of the ion scan was not at issue, other cases reference the use of the ion scan
to test for the presence of drugs on currency, boats, and cars. See, e.g., United States v.
$10,7000.00 U.S. Currency, 258 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[Delaware River and Bay Authority] Sergeant Gaworski vacuumed the automobile and the currency, and subjected both to an ION
[sic] Scan Analysis."); see also United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The
government then conducted an ion scan of the vehicle - nearly two weeks after the vehicle was
first abandoned - which yielded evidence that was introduced at trial."); United States v. Romero,
32 F.3d 641, 646 (1st Cir. 1994) (determining that the court need not addresses the reliability of
the ion scan conducted on the defendants and their boat given the sufficiency of the other evidence
in the record); United States v. Diaz, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("An ion scan
was conducted on various part of the vessel [by the United States Coast Guard] for the purpose of
detecting the presence of cocaine."); Brown v. Ellendale Police Dep't, 1999 WL 223502, at *2 (D.
Del. Mar. 31, 1999) ("The Delaware State Police later conducted an 'ion scan' of the seized
money that revealed the presence of cocaine on the currency."); State of Florida Dept. of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("Two days
after the currency and the vehicle were seized, a United States Coast Guard ion scan test was
conducted and high levels of cocaine were found on the seized currency.").
234
Katz, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2592, at *8-*22 (Sept. 4, 2001) (Whitbeck, J.,
concurring)
(involving night-vision goggles); see Benner, supra note 140, at 107 (discussing "[n]ew passive
imaging technology that can see through clothing to reveal weapons or other hidden items has
already been developed for law enforcement use."); Kanya A. Bennett, Comment, Can Facial
Recognition Technology Be Used to Fight the New War Against Terrorism?: Examining the Constitutionality of FacialRecognition Surveillance Systems, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 151 (2001); John
Lewis, Carnivore - The FBI's Internet Surveillance System: Is It A Rampaging E-Mailasaurus
Rex Devouring Your ConstitutionalRights?, 23 WwyrER L. REv. 317 (2001); Young, supra note
174, at 1023-38 (summarizing newest advances in technological surveillance, including biometrics, beepers, computer systems, and databases); Woo, supra note 174, at 522, 525 (discussing the
"Magic Lantern," new technology developed by the FBI "that is capable of installing a keystroke
logging program on a computer without requiring physical access to the computer" that can track
e-mail messages and internet logs).
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week period.23 5 They observed on each occasion that the windows were closed,
the air conditioning was running, and lights were on in the home, but no one
appeared to be in the residence.2 36 When the anonymous informant contacted
the agents again, they went to the house at 4:45 a.m. on May 19, 1999, and one
of the officers ran a cotton swab across the outside door latch attached to the
front screen door, which attached to a screened-in front porch.237 The swab was
placed in a plastic bag and taken back to the station.23 An ion scan performed
at the station revealed a high presence of marijuana.23 9
A magistrate granted a search warrant based upon the results of the ion
scan, the agents' observations of the residence, and the plain smell of growing
marijuana which they observed (on the day after the ion scan was performed)
during a knock and talk with Ms. Charles at the residence. 24 1 In executing the
warrant, forty-six live marijuana plants were seized, along with information that
led to a second search warrant for a different residence which uncovered drying
marijuana."
Charles was indicted, and a motion to suppress followed.243 The District Court ruled that the government's warrantless use of the ion scan constituted a illegal search under the Fourth Amendment, but denied the motion insofar as the anonymous tips, the knock and talk, and the plain smell of growing
marijuana 44 established probable cause sufficient to uphold the issuance of the
235

Charles, 29 Fed. Appx. at 894-95. The residence was described as, "No. 8 Catherine's Rest

Estates, St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands ('No. 8')... which was located on a piece of land
known as Martin Farm, a fenced-in property containing No. 8 and several other rental houses.
The fence surrounding Martin Farm had an opening which allowed car access to a dirt road known
as Martin Farmer's Road. No. 8 was located approximately one quarter of a mile from the entrance of Martin Farm on Martin Farmer's Road." Id. On May 18, 1999, the same concerned
citizen contacted Officer Diaz and stated that the renter at No. 8 came to the residence for only a
few hours each day, but that the air conditioning remained on at all times and that the windows
were always shut. Id.
236
Id.
237

Id.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding that the officers needed neither

reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to conduct the "knock and talk" because the encounter
did not become "coercive." Id. at 897 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-38 (1991));
see also United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d
947, 951 (3d Cir. 1994); Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Hardman, 36 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
241
Charles, 29 Fed. Appx. at 895.
242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Interestingly, following the hearing on Charles' Motion to Suppress, the District Court held

an experiment whereby 47 live marijuana plants were placed in a holding room in the courtroom
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245
Charles appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
search warrants.
the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court, determining that
outside of the ion scan, saving the
probable cause existed for the search warrants
246
issue of the ion scan "for another day.,

B.

Left for Another Day - Is the Warrantless Use of the Ion Scan on a
Home Constitutional?

On the facts of Charles, the issue is whether the swipe of residue from
the outer latch on the outside screen door leading to a porch and analyzed by an
ion scan constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Since
the Court's decision in Kyllo, the first step of the analysis becomes whether to
apply Kyllo or Katz. Because the ion scan is a piece of sensor-enhancing technology that could be classified as "not in general public use, '24 7 it is more likely
that courts would subject it to Kyllo, rather than to the Katz rubric. The unsettling effect of Kyllo is that different results are reached depending upon whether
the ion scan is analyzed under Katz or Kyllo.
1.

The Wrong Result - Under Kyllo the Ion Scan Constitutes a
Search

Under Kyllo, it is almost certain that the ion scan will be deemed unconstitutional. First of all, the ion scan is a piece of sensory-enhancing technology
that will likely be characterized as "not in general public use., 248 The ion scan
overnight for the District Court to observe the following day. Charles, 29 Fed. Appx. at 895. The
District Court found that "within a second or two of opening the door the room containing the
plants, the fragrance was noticeable. Within another two or three seconds, the strong and distinctive odor permeated the hallway outside the room. The viewing thus confirmed that government's
evidence that green, growing marijuana plants have a very strong and distinctive odor." Id. The
Third Circuit found no reason to disturb the District Court's factual finding. Id. at 898.
Charles, 29 Fed. Appx. at 895.
245
246

Id. at 896.

247

See, e.g., People v. Edwards, No. 4881/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 962, at *26 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. Dec. 21, 2001) (answering the question in the negative with regard to a canine sniff for drugs
because "a person does not have an expectation of privacy to the air outside one's automobile.").
248
Id.; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38-39. It is unclear why the majority in Kyllo labeled the thermal
imager at issue "not in general public use." See sources supra note 189. The ion scan is widely in
use by the military and federal, state, and local police. See Airport Security Systems: Tragedy
Spurs Demand, supra note 230 ("The lonscan is installed in over 40 countries. In 2000, Barringer, Thermedics and Ion Track were part of a $50 million contract from the FAA in 2000 for
trace detection."); see also Jeanne Bonner, Made Stronger by Tragedy, ACCESS CONTROL &
SECURITY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, Sept. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 11858948 (documenting a
private Chicago-based company's use of ion scan technology to test its employees and facilities
for the presence of drugs and noting that "the ion scan ... is also used by the U.S. Coast Guard
and has been in use at [this particular company] for over two years"); Tyra Braden, Couple Says
Money Was From Lottery, But Investigator Testifying in Easton Says the Level of Cocaine on It
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in Charles was performed on a home. 249 These three facts alone - sensoryenhancing technology, not in general public use (whatever that standard means),
and used on a home - would be enough to deem its warrantless use unconstitutional. Moreover, the court could delve into the potential uses and advances of
the ion scan in rationalizing its decision, as opposed to limiting itself to just the
device's use in Charles.250 No inquiry would be necessary into the level of intrusion, 211 the area on which the ion scan was performed, or Charles' expectation of privacy in the contents of her doorknob.
Even if the court did proceed to another layer of analysis under Kyllo, it
is clear that a court would still find the warrantless use of the ion scan unconstitutional. The agents in Charles used the results of the ion scan, along with the
informants' tips and their own visual observations of Charles' residence, in their
application for a search warrant. As in Kyllo, the agents inferred from the ion
scan results that Charles was growing marijuana. This type of inference about
the presence of marijuana (in some form) in the home is, an inference about the
interior of the home - an "intimate detail" of the home that would not have previously been knowable without a physical intrusion into the home.252 Use of the
ion scan reveals details concerning the home - that someone who came in contact with the doorknob had also come in contact with marijuana. The rule promulgated by Kyllo will force courts to deem the warrantless use of an ion scan on
a home an unconstitutional search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Courts could deem the warrantless use of any ion scan unconstitutional, as
opposed to basing its constitutionality only on the facts of each case.253

Shows It's Drug Proceeds, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL
23154664 (discussing Army National Guard Counter Drug Program's use of the ion scan to test
for the presence of drugs on money). But whether such use would meet the majority's (albeit
undefined) standard of "general public use" is questionable. Bruce D. Nordwall, Airport Security
Spurs New Interest in Sensors, AVIATION WEEK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 7, 2002, available at 2002
WL 9355653 (discussing the use of the ion scan technology in airports to screen for thirty different explosives, drugs, and chemicals on passengers).
249
See sources supra note 195 (discussing that the rule in Kyllo may not cover scenarios not
involving the home).
250
See Fisher, supra note 187, at 170-71 (discussing the potential under Kyllo for courts to
have the discretion to consider all uses, and potential uses, of the device at issue, as opposed to
addressing only those facts and details in the record).
251 See Adelman, supra note 173, at 353 (discussing the minimal intrusion involved with the
thermal imager, which is even less than the use of an ion scan which requires physical contact
with the area to be tested).
252
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001); see also sources supra note 190.
253

See Fisher, supra note 187, at 170-71 (discussing majority's decision in Kyllo to develop

this blanket rule as opposed to address only the facts of the thermal imager used in Kyllo).
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Under Katz - The Right Result

Under Katz, the ion scan, as used in Charles, would likely not constitute
a search. The government's use of the ion scan is analogous to those cases in
which the Supreme Court did not find that a legitimate expectation of privacy
existed despite the use of a sensory-enhancing device. The ion scan in Charles
involved only a swab swipe on the front-door handle to the front-screen door of
Charles' house,254 involving minimal intrusion. 55 Unlike so many of the cases
The facts of Charles also raises the issue of curtilage, not seen in Kyllo. Unlike the use of
the thermal imager, an ion scan requires the officers to actually walk-up to a residence and touch
an outer doorknob in order to collect a sample of residue. See United States v. Charles, 29 Fed.
Appx. 892, 894 (3d Cir. 2002). The District Court in Charles had held that the ion scan was an
illegal search because the door latch fell within the curtilage of No. 8. Id. at 896. However, this
was incorrect.
254

The curtilage doctrine developed to extend Fourth Amendment protection to the "intimate
activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"' Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885)), the
proper inquiry being "whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it
should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). The Supreme Court in Dunn explained that the "curtilage is
determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in
question should be treated as the home itself." Id. at 300. The Court laid out four factors to reference:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area
is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to
which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
from observation by people passing by.
Id. at 301. In Dunn, the Court concluded that a barn located sixty yards from the defendant's
home (outside of the fence surrounding the yard) did not fall within the home's curtilage because
(among other reasons) the officers had information (stemming from their own observations and
informants' tips) indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities (but rather for
drug production) and the defendant had not erected a fence to surround the barn or taken other
steps to protect the barn from observation by people walking by. Id. at 302-03.
As seen in Dunn (and as discussed supra), the Fourth Amendment does not protect those
things which an individual exposes to the public. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927). "[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited." Katz, 398 U.S. at 361. In other words,
"a Fourth Amendment search does not occur - even when the explicitly protected location of a
house is concerned - unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search [and] society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."' Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-31 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
"That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation." Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 213. Despite the fact that the latch at issue arguably falls within the curtilage of No. 8,
there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in that latch given its exposure to the public and the
limited nature of the swabbing that took place. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (aerial surveillance
not a search despite fact that marijuana patch was located within curtilage of the home). Therefore, under the curtilage doctrine, on the facts in Charles, simply because the doorknob was on the
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in which the Supreme Court found that the defendants had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy because of the steps they had taken to protect their privacy, there is nothing to indicate that Charles had such an expectation with regard to the door latch at issue.256 Even if Charles could argue that she had a
subjective expectation of privacy in her outer door latch, such an expectation
would arguably not be legitimate because she "assumed the risk" when she
openly exposed her doorknob and constructed no barrier to prevent any
neighbor, solicitor, mailman, or officer from walking up the path to her door and
observing the latch.2 57 Further, it is hard to imagine that society would find an
objectively reasonable interest in one's privacy regarding the contents of the
grime on a home's outer doorknobs. Therefore, under Katz, the government's
warrantless use of the ion scan likely did not constitute a search.
Given the recent voting of the Supreme Court in Riley, 258 Bond,259 and
26
Kyllo, should the use of an ion scan reach the Supreme Court, it is hard to
predict which way the Court will go. Nonetheless, under the Kyllo analysis, the
ion scan would constitute a search. According to Kyllo, it is unnecessary to inquire into the defendant's or society's expectations of privacy or the details concerning the actual use of the device and the level of intrusion involved. This is
difficult to accept, given the many decades of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law that has resulted from Katz (i.e., what is a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and whether it is one that society is willing to recognize). With one
case, the Supreme Court has weakened this history (and possibly eliminated it),
in exchange for a blanket rule that will likely bar the warrantless use of all sensory-enhancing technology, at least when the use involves a home.
front door of the residence would not make this ion scan illegal.
255 See Adelman, supra note 173, at 353 (discussing the level of intrusion involved with the
thermal imager, which was less than with the ion scan because the ion scan requires actual, physical contact with the area to be searched); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing minimal level of intrusion involved with canine sniff of luggage).
256 See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (defendant completely surrounded marijuana patch with
two fences, one of which was ten feet high); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
230 (1986) (fences and covers made facility at issue virtually impossible to observe from ground
level); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (defendant placed growing marijuana
in area surrounded by woods, chicken wire fence, and "No Trespassing" signs).
257
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979) (defendant "assumed the risk"
when he voluntarily exposed the dialed numbers to the phone company); see also United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in one's physical
movements from place to place because they were easily observable by any member of the public); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no legitimate expectation of privacy
where defendant exposed garbage bags in an area particularly suited for public inspection and
observation).
258 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see also discussion supra Part I.D.
259

Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); see also discussion supra Part II.D.

260

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also discussion supra note 164.
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McShain: Not Quite Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451: The Uncertain Future of Sens
FUTURE OF SENSE ENHANCING TECHNOLOGY
V. CONCLUSION

The majority in Kyllo eliminated the Katz analysis in this new area of
rapidly advancing sensory-enhancing technology, at least when a home is involved. This is an unsettling result, given that for over thirty years, Katz and its
progeny have been so deeply imbedded in this country's Fourth Amendment
search and seizure law. With Kyllo, the Supreme Court has in effect obliterated
this entire tradition. Kyllo should have been decided only on the facts before the
Court. The majority was wrong to promulgate this overly broad and unnecessary rule that will likely bar the warrantless use of all sensory-enhancing technology, at least when the use involves a home.
Society loses very little by way of its freedoms by giving police the authority to conduct off-the-wall thermal scans from across the street of its homes
or ion scans on its doorknobs. This is not to say that potential technology that
can peer through walls and actually see into homes should be upheld in the future. It is to say that it was unnecessary for the Court in Kyllo to go beyond the
facts of the thermal imager before it and to introduce this blanket rule that will
make it virtually impossible for the warrantless use of any type of sensoryenhancing technology on a home to ever survive constitutional analysis.
In Fahrenheit 451, Ray Bradbury wrote of book-sniffing mechanical
hounds, controlled by the fire departments and programmed to detect books in
homes. Bradbury portrayed a society with no free thought or ideas, wholly controlled by the government, one in which every person was being watched and
monitored every second of the day. The Supreme Court in Kyllo painted a picture of sensory-enhancing technology on the horizon that would position American society almost on the verge of, if not inside, Bradbury's novel, a portrait of
our government using devices that pierce through walls and monitor every move
we make inside our own homes. But the measuring of the relative heat emanating off the outer walls of a house is a far cry from Bradbury's extreme.
The majority in Kyllo went too far. What the Supreme Court sought to
protect and preserve in Kyllo should be applauded. That said, the majority overreacted in its decision to put forth this rule that in effect will bar the government's and law enforcement's warrantless use of sensory-enhancing devices on
the home for all time. As a result, the majority unnecessarily restricted local,
state, and federal authorities in their efforts to slow the drug trade and monitor
terrorism. Kyllo could have and should have been a simple case under Katz.
While it is still too early to predict just how far the lower courts will push Kyllo
into non-technology and non-residence cases, it is safe to say that the result of
the majority's opinion in Kyllo is nothing more than a confusing and overly
broad rule that will plague the courts for years to come, while restricting local,
state, and federal government's use of important tools in the wars against drugs
and terrorism.
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